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EXPRESS YOURSELF: STRIKING A BALANCE
BETWEEN SILENCE AND ACTIVE, PURPOSIVE
OPPOSITION UNDER TITLE VII'S ANTI-
RETALIATION PROVISION
Matthew W Green, Jr. *
"When one door closes another opens; but we often look so long
and so regretfully upon the closed door that we do not see the one which
has opened for us. " -Alexander Graham Bell
I. INTRODUCTION
What does the word "oppose" mean? The U.S. Supreme Court
addressed the ostensibly simple question in Crawford v. Metropolitan
Government of Nashville & Davidson County, Tennessee.' To date,
Crawford is the Roberts Court's most recent employment discrimination
decision involving retaliation.2 In Crawford, the Court broadly
* Assistant Professor, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law; LL.M., Columbia University,
Harlan Fiske Stone Scholar; J.D., University of Baltimore School of Law, Magna Cum Laude; B.A.,
University of Maryland, College Park; law clerk to the Hon. Eric L. Clay, U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit, 2001-2002 and the Hon. Deborah K. Chasanow, U.S. District Court for the
District of Maryland, 2000-2001. 1 owe very special thanks to Professor Michael Hayes at the
University of Baltimore School of Law for his helpful criticism of earlier drafts. I would also like to
thank my colleague Professor Browne C. Lewis at Cleveland-Marshall College of Law for her
comments and encouragement regarding this article as well as research assistants Jill Battagline and
Tyessa V. Howard for their hard work.
1. 129 S. Ct. 846, 850-52 (2009).
2. See id. The Roberts Court has decided four retaliation cases, and in each the plaintiff
prevailed. See id.; CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 128 S. Ct. 1951, 1954, 1961 (2008); Gomez-
Perez v. Potter, 128 S. Ct. 1931, 1935 (2008); Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S.
53, 73 (2006). The Court also has granted certiorari in another case involving retaliation for the
2010 term. See Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 567 F.3d 804 (6th Cir. 2009) (en banc), cert.
granted, 130 S. Ct. 3542 (2010). The Court's recent decisions have resulted in increased scholarly
attention on retaliation. See, e.g., Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation, 90 MINN. L. REV. 18, 19 (2005)
(observing that legal scholarship focuses mainly on bias rather than retaliation); Brianne J. Gorod,
Rejecting "Reasonableness ": A New Look at Title VII's Anti-Retaliation Provision, 56 AM. U. L.
REV. 1469, 1470 (2007) (noting that previously, Title VII's anti-retaliation provisions were
underappreciated by commentators and courts, and not receiving the same amount of attention given
107
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interpreted the opposition clause under Title VII's anti-retaliation
provisions. That clause bars discrimination because, inter alia, an
employee or applicant "has opposed" an employment practice made
unlawful by Title VII.4 The Court proclaimed in Crawford that the
common everyday meaning of the term oppose encompasses "to be
hostile or adverse to, as in opinion."5 Does the word oppose under Title
VII contemplate opinion opposition? The answer is far from clear. In
his concurring opinion in Crawford, Justice Alito was concerned that the
Court's "dicta " of opposition by "opinion" could be taken as
recognizing "silent opposition." Justice Alito's concern regarding silent
opposition was prescient. After Crawford, some lower court judges
among others have discussed the viability of silent opposition.
to the statute as a whole); Alex B. Long, The Troublemaker's Friend: Retaliation Against Third
Parties and the Right of Association in the Workplace, 59 FLA. L. REV. 931, 936 (2007)
(contending, among other things, that Burlington Northern & Santa Fe should result in a broader
interpretation of Title VII's anti-retaliation provisions); Michael Selmi, The 2007-2008 Term: The
Government Changes Its Tune and the Supreme Court Takes a Pragmatic Turn, 12 EMP. RTS. &
EMP. POL'Y J. 161, 165 (2008) (describing the recent trend in retaliation as evidence of a
pragmatism within the Court); Michael J. Zimmer, A Pro-Employee Supreme Court?: The
Retaliation Decisions, 60 S.C. L. REV. 917, 918 (2009) (describing a pro-employee stance that the
Court has taken in retaliation cases, and how this recent trend is evidence of a pragmatism within
the Court).
3. See Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 850-52. Title VII's anti-retaliation provision contains two
clauses that protect against unlawful discrimination: the opposition clause and the participation
clause. Id.; see Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006). This
article focuses on the opposition clause as it considers, among other things, whether silent
opposition, a concept ostensibly recognized as a form of opposition in Crawford, is an actionable
form of opposition under Title VIl. See 129 S. Ct. at 851; see, e.g., Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless,
LP, 567 F.3d 804, 823-24 (6th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (Moore, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct.
3542 (2010); see also discussion infra Part HI.
4. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). For the sake of brevity, this article uses the term "employee"
when discussing the reach of the opposition clause. However, the statute bars employers from
discriminating against both employees or applicants. See id.
5. Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 850.
6. Id at 854 (Alito, J., concurring).
7. See Thompson, 567 F.3d at 818 (majority opinion). In Thompson, an en banc case from
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the dissenting opinions cited Crawford as
potentially recognizing silent opposition to support the retaliation claim of a plaintiff who was fired
after his fianc6 complained of sex discrimination. See, e.g., id. at 818-19 (Martin, J., dissenting)
(relying on Crawford to demonstrate that the term "oppose" includes "silent opposition of
everything from gay marriage to the death penalty, without requiring anyone to shout it from the
rooftops"). According to the dissenting judges, under Crawford's broad understanding of
opposition, the plaintiff should have been allowed to argue that by virtue of his relationship, his
employer could have reasonably inferred his opposition to his fianc6's discrimination and fired him
because of it. See id at 818-20; see also id. at 823-24 (Moore, J., dissenting); DIANNE AVERY,
MARIA L. ONTIVEROS, ROBERTO L. CORRADA, MICHAEL SELMI & MELISSA HART, EMPLOYMENT
108
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This article considers and rejects that Crawford should be read as
opening the door to silent opposition. Crawford did recognize that one
of the many meanings of the term oppose is to be hostile to as in
opinion.8 As the Court has stated elsewhere, however, "[a] word in a
statute [does not necessarily] extend to the outer limits of its definitional
possibilities." 9 Relying on principles of statutory interpretation, this
article demonstrates that silent opposition is inconsistent with the
language, context, structure and purposes of Title VII and should not be
counted among the types of opposition recognized under the statute."o
Although the article determines that Crawford should not open the
door to silent opposition, it also examines the type of opposition
consistent with the plain language of Title VII for which Crawford did
open doors. It does so specifically in response to Justice Alito's
concerns regarding silent opposition. To quell concerns regarding silent
opposition (including possibly holding employers liable for retaliation
when employees have never expressed a word of opposition to
employers), Justice Alito proposed that to be actionable, Title VII
opposition should contain an active, purposive requirement." Under this
standard, it is not enough that the employee opposes the employer's
alleged discrimination or that the opposition, in fact, reaches the
employer's attention. It requires that the employee oppose
discrimination for a specific purpose, including ending, remediating or
correcting the discrimination, and also requires that the employee intend
to bring the opposition to the employer's attention for these purposes. 12
DISCRIMINATION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS ON EQUALITY IN THE WORKPLACE 173 (8th ed.
2010) (noting that Crawford "seems to suggest that silent opposition to unlawful discrimination can
sometimes be protected"; but also noting that Justice Scalia, who joined the majority opinion, stated
during oral argument in Crawford "that he would have an issue if the Court's reading [of the anti-
retaliation provision] meant silent opposition would be protected"); John B. Lough, Jr., Employers
Still Cannot Retaliate: Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville, 13 Haw. B. J. 4, 10
(2009) (explaining that Crawford defined opposition as to be adverse to as in opinion and may set
the stage for silent opposition). This article does not address the issue of whether a Title VII
plaintiff may assert a claim for retaliation based on the opposition conduct of another employee.
Rather, it addresses whether silent or opinion opposition generally is cognizable under the statute.
8. Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 850.
9. Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481,486 (2006).
10. See discussion infra Part I.
11. See Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 854 (Alito, J., concurring). -
12. See id.; see also Pitrolo v. Cnty. of Buncombe, N.C., No. 07-2145, 2009 WL 1010634, at
*3 (4th Cir. Mar. 11, 2009) (applying active, purposive standard and affirming dismissal of
retaliation claim where employee did not intend to bring her grievance to her employer's attention
although employer undisputedly learned of it).
2010]1 109
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The following factual scenario is a composite of cases employing
the active, purposive standard and demonstrates the problems that arise
by adopting this standard. 13
Miriam is one of two female employees in the fifteen-employee tech
department of a large medical device testing company. She has
contemplated quitting several times. Her supervisor Connor is the
problem. At first, Connor would compliment her almost daily on her
hair and make-up. While it made her uncomfortable, she thought she
could handle it. Besides she was relatively new to the company,
Connor was considered a "rock star," and she did not want any trouble.
Things soon got worse. Once he walked up behind her, put his arm
around her waist, and told her he could make her life pleasant or
unpleasant, "her choice." When she asked him what he meant, he
stroked her breast and said "I think you know." Over the next couple
of months, he made similar comments, groped her rear and breasts
repeatedly and once forcibly tried to kiss her. He also told her not to
wear pantyhose anymore as he liked the look of her bare legs, and
more than once he tried to raise her skirt. Miriam didn't want to lose
her job, so although she knew about the company's sexual harassment
policy, she decided not to report the harassment to the human
resources department as the policy required. She had a better idea.
She had seen a notice for a position in another department, which
would have meant a promotion for her. She knew she was qualified
for the job and thought if she could get it, her problems would be
solved. However, because of the stress of the Connor incidents, about
two or three months after Connor's initial comments, she complained
about what was going on at work to her coworker, Sylvia Monroe, a
supervisor who works in another department. Sylvia took it upon
herself to contact human resources and complain on Miriam's behalf.
The company began an investigation into the matter. After the
allegations came to light, Miriam immediately felt shunned by
coworkers and made to feel like the entire matter was her fault. She
also did not receive the promotion and believed it was in retaliation for
her harassment complaint.
13. See Pitrolo, 2009 WL 1010634, at *3 (holding that plaintiffs retaliation claim failed as
she did not act purposively when she complained about sex discrimination to her father with no
intention of telling management herself); Ackel v. Nat'l Commc'ns, Inc., 339 F.3d 376, 385 (5th
Cir. 2003) (holding that plaintiff who alleged sexual harassment and retaliation had not engaged in
protected activity for purposes of a retaliation claim after complaining only to a coworker with no
intent to notify management).
110
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Under the active, purposive standard, an employee in Miriam's
position would be unable to assert a viable retaliation claim regarding
the failed promotion. Although her employer undisputedly learned of
her complaint, she failed to act purposively in lodging the complaint.14
Adopting an active, purposive standard of opposition, some courts have
rejected retaliation claims when, as in Miriam's case, the opposition is
indirectly communicated and not at the behest of the victim.'"
Under a plain reading of the statute, however, it should not matter
how an employer learns of the opposition, directly or indirectly, or
whether the employee intends to bring the opposition to the employer's
attention. What matters is whether the opposition reaches the
employer's attention and whether the employer discriminates on the
basis of the opposition. Thus, opposition that is indirectly and
unintentionally expressed to an employer is no less actionable than
directly expressed, intentional opposition.
The courts requiring purposive opposition have engaged in a
cramped reading of the statute that is inconsistent with its language,
structure, and purposes. By its terms, the statute requires only that
employees oppose unlawful employment practices.16 It does not require
they do so for any particular purpose.' 7 From a normative perspective,
the article contends that whenever an employee expresses, intentionally
or otherwise, what may reasonably be interpreted or inferred as
opposition to an alleged unlawful employment practice, and the
employer retaliates because of that expression, the latter has violated the
statute's anti-retaliation provision. The article, therefore, proposes a
standard of expressive opposition. Such opposition may be manifested
in any number of ways-words, action, or inaction-and requires only
that opposition may be reasonably inferred from such expression. The
article demonstrates that such a standard is consistent with the language
and structure of Title VII and comports with Crawford's broad reading
of the statute.
The active, purposive standard is thus ill-advised for several
reasons. It ignores that opposition may be unintentional. The Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") has long recognized
14. As explained later, Miriam's harassment claim would likely also fail as she did not follow
her employer's reporting procedure, and a court would likely not consider her complaint prompt.
See discussion infra Part V.C.
15. See Pitrolo, 2009 WL 1010634, at *3; Ackel, 339 F.3d 376, 385.
16. See Title VU1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006).
17. See id.
2010] ill
HeinOnline  -- 28 Hofstra Lab. & Emp. L. J. 111 2010
HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENTLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 28:107
that an employee may engage in conduct that an employer interprets as
opposition to employment discrimination even where the employee did
not intend to oppose discrimination." Lower courts also have
recognized that when an employer discriminates on the basis of what it
interprets as opposition by an employee, the employer violates Title
VII's anti-retaliation provision. 9 The employee's intent is irrelevant.20
However, the employer's intent to discriminate is the critical issue, and
if the employer discriminates because it interprets certain conduct as
opposition, the statute requires no more to impose liability.2 1
The standard would also exacerbate extant gaps in protection in
workplace harassment law. Miriam's situation is a classic example. As
explained later, because of the manner in which the courts have
interpreted workplace harassment law, a plaintiff in Miriam's position
would be unlikely to prevail on a sexual harassment claim. 2 2 The result
is grounded in the way courts have interpreted the affirmative defense
set forth in Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth2 3 and Faragher v. City
of Boca Raton.2 4 That defense allows employers to escape liability or
limit damages in certain cases where the perpetrator of harassment is a
supervisory employee.2 5 In these circumstances, a court would likely
find that Miriam failed to act reasonably to avoid harm because she
failed to use her employer's complaint procedure, and when she did
complain, she did so more than two months after the first incident of
harassment.26 The problem is that out of fear of retaliation most victims
of workplace harassment do not formally complain as an initial response
to harassment.27 The Burlington-Faragher affirmative defense's
disregard of that workplace reality is one of the reasons scholars have
18. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
19. See discussion infra Part IV.B; see also Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561,
567, 571-72 (3rd Cir. 2002) (holding that a plaintiff that is either perceived to have engaged in
protected activity, or has actually engaged in protected activity under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act ("ADEA"), is subject to the same retaliation claim analysis as in Title VII);
Grosso v. City Univ. of N.Y., No. 03 Civ. 2619NRB, 2005 WL 627644, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16,
2005) (employing same analysis as Fogleman, but directly to Title VII claim).
20. Grosso, 2005 WL 627644, at *3.
21. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
22. See discussion infra Part V.
23. 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998).
24. 524 U.S. 775, 777-78 (1998).
25. See Burlington, 524 U.S. 742 at 765; see also Faragher, 524 U.S. at 778.
26. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
27. See Crawford v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., Tenn., 129 S. Ct. at 852
(citing Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation, 90 MINN. L. REv. 18, 20 (2005)).
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criticized the standard as creating unnecessary gaps in protection for
victims of unlawful workplace discrimination. 2 8 The active, purposive
standard would compound such gaps. 2 9 Not only would an employee in
Miriam's position likely have no viable claim for harassment, but
because her opposition was non-purposive, her retaliation claim
regarding her promotion would fail as well. The active, purposive
standard, therefore, would serve as one more hurdle for victims of
workplace harassment to obtain relief under the statute if, after their
harassment comes to light, they encounter retaliation.
Finally, the active, purposive standard is premised on irrelevant
policy concerns. The primary impetus for this standard appears to stem
from the flux of retaliation claims in recent years.30 It is true that
according to EEOC charge statistics, retaliation charges have
proliferated in the past several years.3 1 However, that is a concern for
Congress, which implemented a broadly worded anti-retaliation
provision to protect employees who, among other things, oppose
unlawful workplace discrimination. Courts should not be in the
business of promulgating prophylactic rules contrary to the plain
language of Title VII that narrows rights Congress gave.
In short, although the article determines that while Crawford should
not open the door to silent opposition, the active, purposive requirement
that Justice Alito championed and that some courts pre- and post-
Crawford have adopted goes too far the other way.33 There is a swath of
28. See Deborah L. Brake & Joanna L. Grossman, The Failure of Title VII As a Rights-
Claiming Statute, 86 N.C. L. REv. 859, 880 (2008). Courts have found it unreasonable under the
Burlington-Faragher affirmative defense for employees to complain to the wrong person under a
company's harassment policy, to go directly to the EEOC or a union representative to complain, to
provide insufficient information for the employer to conduct an investigation, or to fail to cooperate
in an investigation. Id. According to the authors, the defense is one of the reasons that Title VII
fails as a system for claiming non-discrimination rights. Id. Anne Lawton, Operating in an
Empirical Vacuum: The Ellerth and Faragher Affirmative Defense, 13 COLUM. J. GENDER & L.
197, 215 (2004) (noting that a number of federal courts hold that an employee who delays reporting
harassment or who fails to use the employer's reporting procedure designated in its harassment
policy fails to act reasonably. The courts do not address the reasons for the employee's behavior in
light of case facts); Long, supra note 2, at 953 (explaining that courts hold that a failure to use an
employer's internal mechanism for reporting harassment is unjustified under the Burlington-
Faragher affirmative defense).
29. See Brake & Grossman, supra note 28, at 897, 898.
30. Crawford, 129 S. Ct. 846, 854 (2009) (Alito, J., concurring).
31. See Charge Statistics FY 1997 Through FY 2009, U.S. EQUAL EMPL'T OPPORTUNfTY
COMM'N, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm (last visited Dec. 22, 2010).
32. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (a) (2006).
33. See infra Part III.B.3.b.
2010] 113
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opposition conduct that stands between silence and the standard that
Justice Alito and some courts advocate.34 This article explores where
that line should be drawn.
The article is set forth in five parts. Part II briefly explains the
opposition clause and discusses Crawford. Part III examines the
language, context, structure and purposes of Title VII and concludes that
the statute's anti-retaliation provision does not contemplate silent
opposition. Part IV sets forth the expressive form of opposition that is
consistent with the language of Title VII. Such opposition falls short of
the active, purposive opposition Justice Alito and some lower courts
have championed but requires more than silence.35 Part IV further
explains why the active, purposive standard should be rejected as a
threshold for actionable opposition under Title VII. Part V applies the
standard of expressive opposition proposed here to the hypothetical set
forth previously involving Miriam, in which her opposition conduct is
not silent but also would fail to meet the onerous active, purposive
standard.
II. RETALIATION: CRAWFORD AND ITS DICTA OF
OPPOSITION BY OPINION 36
A. The Limited Nature of the Opposition Clause
Title VII provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for
employment . . . because he has opposed any practice made an
unlawful employment practice [under Title VII], or because he has
made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter. 37
Title VII's anti-retaliation clause protects an individual who has
opposed an unlawful employment practice or who has made a charge,
34. See discussion infra Part HI.A.
35. See discussion infra Part IV.
36. While this article focuses on the opposition clause (as did Crawford), Part A briefly
explains the participation and opposition clauses contained in Title VII's anti-retaliation provision
and when each clause has been held to apply. Part B discusses Crawford and its interpretation of
the opposition clause.
37. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (emphasis added).
114 [Vol. 28:107
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testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in a Title VII
"investigation, proceeding, or hearing."08  A plaintiff does not have to
show that he or she opposed a practice that was actually unlawful under
Title VII, but typically, that he or she had a reasonable, good-faith belief
that the practice was unlawful.3 9 Most lay people are not versed in the
law, and courts recognized early on the problems that would inure were
Title VII literally interpreted to protect employees against retaliation
only if they prove the employer conduct about which they complained
was actually unlawful under the statute.40
The courts that have decided the issue have held that employees
who file a charge of discrimination with an administrative agency are
protected by Title VII's anti-retaliation participation clause.41
3 8. Id.
39. See, e.g., Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 261-62 (1st Cir.
1999) (explaining that Title VII does not require that the activity complained of actually be unlawful
only that the employee reasonably believed that it was unlawful and communicates that belief to the
employer in good faith); Payne v. McLemore's Wholesale & Retail Stores, 654 F.2d 1130, 1140 &
n. 11 (5th Cir. 1981) ("To effectuate the policies of Title VII and to avoid the chilling effect that
would otherwise arise, we are compelled to conclude that a plaintiff can establish a prima facie case
of retaliatory discharge under the opposition clause . . . if he shows that he had a reasonable belief
that the employer was engaged in unlawful employment practices.") (noting that other courts
require the reasonable belief be held in "good faith"); Sias v. City Demonstration Agency, 588 F.2d
692, 695 (9th Cir. 1978) (employee is protected under the opposition clause if he reasonably
believes discrimination has occurred and opposes it, even if he is later mistaken).
40. See Payne, 654 F.2d at 1140 ("To effectuate the policies of Title VII and to avoid the
chilling effect that would otherwise arise, we are compelled to conclude that a plaintiff can establish
a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge under the opposition clause . . . if he shows that he had a
reasonable belief that the employer was engaged in unlawful employment practices" and noting that
other courts require the reasonable belief be held in "good faith"). While the standard was
promulgated to assist plaintiffs, scholars have increasingly criticized the standard as some courts
have narrowly interpreted the instances when an employee has a good faith reasonable belief that
discrimination exists. See Long, supra note 2, at 955 (noting that some courts have held an
employee's reasonable belief to that from the prospective of a labor and employment lawyer and not
a plaintiff unversed in discrimination law); see also Brake & Grossman, supra note 28, at 914
(arguing that while the "rationale for the reasonable belief doctrine is sound ... [it] has failed to
honor its original purpose-to protect the employee whose belief in unlawful discrimination turns
out to be mistaken").
41. See, e.g., Booker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 879 F.2d 1304, 1313 (6th Cir.
1989) (holding that participation clause applies when administrative proceedings are instituted
leading to the filing of a complaint or charge, including visiting a government agency to inquire
about filing a charge); see also Aguilar v. Arthritis Osteoporosis Ctr., No. M-03-243, 2006 WL
2478476, at *6-7 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 25, 2006) (describing different holdings with regard to
administrative proceeding in connection with the participation clause). Although legislative history
of the anti-retaliation provision is sparse, there is some support in the history for this interpretation.
See Interpretative Memorandum of Title VII of H.R. 7152, 110 Cong. Rec. 7212, 7213 (1964)
(Retaliation provision "prohibits discrimination by an employer . . . against person for opposing
2010] 115
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Participation in an employee's internal investigation into allegations of
discrimination conducted apart from a formal charge filed with an
administrative agency does not typically fall within the scope of
participation clause protection.4 2 Thus, the opposition clause is
considered to provide protection during more informal employer or pre-
charge investigations of discrimination. 3
It is generally recognized that the participation clause, when it
applies, affords more complete protection to victims of alleged
retaliation than the opposition clause." One reason for this result is that
the clauses are worded differently.45 The participation clause protects
employees or applicants from discrimination if they have "made a
charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in [a Title VII]
investigation, proceeding, or hearing. "6 The phrase in any manner has
been interpreted literally.47 Thus, an employee is protected even if the
charge lacks merit or contains allegations that are wrong, defamatory, or
malicious.48
discriminatory practices, and for bringing charges before the Commission or otherwise participating
in proceedings under the title.").
42. See Aguilar, 2006 WL 2478476, at *7; see also Correa v. Mana Products, Inc., 550 F.
Supp. 2d 319, 330-31 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (quoting Bick v. City of N.Y., No. 95 Civ. 8781, 1997 WL
381801 at 329 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 1997) ("[I]n order to gain protection under the participation
clause, the 'participation must be in an investigation or proceeding covered by Title VII, and thus
not in an internal employer investigation."')). See generally Long, supra note 2, at 953-54
("Federal courts uniformly have held that resort to an employer's internal procedures for handling
discrimination does not fall under the participation clause for purposes of a retaliation claim ...
such activity is protected, if at all, under the opposition clause."); Brake & Grossman, supra note
28, at 914 (The opposition clause provides protection "where Title VII's formal enforcement
processes have not yet been invoked.").
43. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (a).
44. See Deravin v. Kerik, 335 F.3d 195, 203 & n.6 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting that the opposition
clause is narrower than the participation clause and that courts have held that the participation
clause, which protects participation in any manner "is expansive and seemingly contains no
limitations); Booker, 879 F.2d at 1312 (recognizing that "federal courts have generally granted less
protection for opposition than for participation in enforcement proceedings"); Sias, 588 F.2d at 695
(indicating that the opposition clause offers more limited protection than the participation clause).
45. See Glover v. S.C. Law Enforcement Div., 170 F.3d 411, 415 (4th Cir. 1999) (stating that
due to textual differences between the participation and opposition clauses, the participation clause
offers broader protection).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (emphasis added); see also Deravin, 335 F.3d at 203; Booker, 879
F.2d at 1312.
47. See Booker, 879 F.2d at 1312.
48. See Deravin, 335 F.3d at 203-04; Booker, 879 F.2d at 1312 (explaining that protection
under the participation clause has been held to exist even if the charge alleges facts that are deemed
wrong, malicious, or defamatory); see also Sias, 588 F.2d at 695 (explaining that the participation
clause shields an employee from retaliation even if the charge lacks any merit). The participation
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This is not the case with the opposition clause. To determine
whether opposition conduct is protected, courts balance the purpose of
the act to protect individuals engaging in reasonable opposition activities
and Congress' desire not to tie the hands of employers to select and
control personnel.4 9 Nonetheless, a wide array of conduct has been
considered protected under the opposition clause.o The following
discussion focuses on the opposition clause as it concerns the protection
Title VII affords employees in the informal, pre-charge workplace
setting at issue in Crawford.
B. Crawford: Reading "Oppose "for All It's Worth
1. A Broad Reading of Oppose
During part of an internal investigation of rumors of sexual
harassment, Vicky Crawford's employer, Metropolitan Government of
Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee ("Metro") asked her whether
she had ever witnessed "inappropriate behavior" by the alleged subject
of the investigation, Gene Hughes.1 Several employees had complained
about Hughes, who himself was the Metropolitan employee typically
responsible for investigating discrimination complaints.52 Crawford, a
30-year Metro employee, was not among the initial complainants, but
the human resources officer investigating the rumors sought her
statements as a potential witness because she had worked with Hughes.5 3
clause has also been held to offer broader protection because participation occurs in the context of
formal proceedings and thus is "essential to the machinery set up by Title VII." Shoaf v. Kimberly-
Clark Corp., 294 F. Supp. 2d 746, 755-56 (M.D.N.C. 2003).
49. See Booker, 879 F.2d at 1312 (noting that employees are not protected when they violate
legitimate employer rules and orders, disrupt the employment environment or interfere with the
employer's goals); see also Shoaf, 294 F. Supp. 2d at 754-55 (holding that employee's providing
confidential information to another employee who had filed a discrimination claim against their
employer was not protected opposition under Title VII, since the employee supplying the
information breached the employer's trust and confidence).
50. See, e.g., EEOC v. Navy Fed. Credit Union, 424 F.3d 397, 406 (4th Cir. 2005) (citing
Bryant v. Aiken Reg'l Med. Ctrs., Inc., 33 F.3d 536, 543-44 (4th Cir. 2003)) (noting that protected
opposition may include staging informal protests, voicing an opinion to an employer about
discrimination or voicing complaints about suspected discrimination).
51. See Crawford v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., Tenn., 129 S. Ct. 846, 849
(2009).
52. See Crawford v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., Tenn., 211 F. App'x 37,
374 (6th Cir. 2006).
53. Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 849.
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Crawford explained in graphic terms that she had not only witnessed
Hughes's harassment but had endured it.54 Metropolitan took no action
against Hughes, but later fired Crawford and two other employees who
had also spoken up against Hughes during the investigation.5 5
The lower courts discussed Crawford's claim in the context of Title
VII's opposition clause.56 Like several other courts that had addressed
the matter, the Sixth Circuit previously had held that the participation
clause only comes into play in connection with the filing of a charge
with the EEOC.57 Crawford's case involved pre-charge statements; thus,
the Sixth Circuit determined that the participation clause was
inapplicable to her retaliation claim.5 Moreover, according to Sixth
Circuit precedent, protected opposition "demand[ed] active, consistent
'opposing' activities."59 The Sixth Circuit held that Crawford's response
to questions about Hughes and relaying unfavorable information about
him in the process was not the type of rigorous opposition Title VII
protected, and her employer was therefore free to fire her.60
Reversing, the Supreme Court began its analysis by examining the
plain language of Title VII's anti-retaliation provisions, and particularly
the term "oppose." 6 1 Consulting dictionaries, the Court explained that
oppose carries several meanings, including "to resist or antagonize ...
to contend against; to confront; resist; withstand." 62  The Court
acknowledged that these terms "entail varying expenditures of energy."63
The Court, however, pointed out that the term may also mean "to be
hostile or adverse to, as in opinion."
54. Id. Crawford described several run-ins with Hughes. She stated that once Hughes
responded to her greeting by "grabbing his crotch and saying '[Y]ou know what's up."' Id She
stated that he would repeatedly "put his crotch up to [her] window," and once grabbed her head and
lowered it to his crotch. Id.
55. See id
56. See id at 850.
57. Id.; see also Aguilar v. Arthritis Osteoporosis Ctr., No. M-03-243, 2006 WL 2478476, at
*6-7 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 25, 2006) (stating that the Fifth, Eighth and Ninth Circuits have held that the
participation clause does not apply in the absence of a formal charge filed with the EEOC).
58. See Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 850.
59. Seeid.at851.
60. See id.
61. See id. at 850. The Supreme Court did not address the applicability of the participation
clause or question the Sixth Circuit's holding about the inapplicability of that clause with respect to
pre-charge conduct. See id. at 853.
62. See id at 850 (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1710 (2d ed.
1958)).
63. Id
64. Id (quoting RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1359 (2d ed.
118
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The Court held that Crawford's exposing Hughes's actions
qualified as opposition.5 For support, it relied on the EEOC's brief,
filed in support of the plaintiff.66 According to the agency's compliance
manual, which the Court essentially adopted, "'[w]hen an employee
communicates to her employer a belief that the employer has engaged in
. . . employment discrimination that communication' virtually always
'constitutes the employee's opposition to the activity."' 67
The Court explained that while the Sixth Circuit's rule of active,
consistent opposing conduct may encompass opposition, it did not
reflect the limits of that term. For instance, the Court noted that one
may oppose something, such as capital punishment or slavery by doing
69
nothing more than disclosing one's opposition. Crawford
demonstrates that opposition does not require a plaintiff to launch a
letter writing campaign or take to the streets with protest signs. 70
Considering the breadth of the meaning of the term, including taking no
action at all but merely holding a contrary opinion to something, the
Court held that a reasonable juror could find that Crawford's statements
describing the "louche goings-on" were antagonistic, resistant, or
71
opposition to Hughes's treatment.
1987)).
65. Id. at 850-51.
66. See id. at 851.
67. Id. at 851 (quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at
9, Crawford v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., Tenn., 129 S. Ct. 846 (2009) (No. 06-
1595) ("When an employee communicates to her employer a belief that the employer has engaged
in activity that constitutes a form of employment discrimination, that communication constitutes the
employee's opposition to the activity.")). The Court noted that one can imagine exceptions, such as
an employee's description of a supervisor's racist joke as hilarious. Id. Such examples were
"eccentric," according to the Court. Id. Further, Crawford's case did not fall within the eccentric
category. Id.
68. Seeid at 851.
69. Id.
70. Id.; see Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 567 F.3d 804, 818 (6th Cir. 2009) (en banc)
(Martin, J., dissenting) ("Countless people were known to 'oppose' slavery before Emancipation, or
are said to 'oppose' capital punishment today, without writing public letters, taking to the streets, or
resisting the government"), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 3542 (2010).
71. See Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 850-51. The Court also rejected arguments advanced by the
employer and amici that unless the bar is set high regarding the type of conduct deemed to be
opposition, employers would have little incentive to investigate possible discrimination because
they will want to avoid the headache of asking about possible discrimination, which could then
result in liability as it did here. See id. at 851-52. The Court explained, however, that such
reasoning ignores the strong incentive employers have under cases such as Burlington Industries,
Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998), and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 852. Under those cases, employers enjoy an affirmative defense to claims
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The Court's decision seems correct considering Title VII's
purposes of eliminating discrimination in the workplace, and the Court's
recognition that Title VII favors conciliation to litigation.72 While Title
VII allows certain individuals to sue for discrimination proscribed by the
statute (including retaliation), the statute's primary purpose is not to
provide redress but to avoid harm to employees by ridding the
workplace of discrimination.7 3 Title VII in this sense seeks to avoid
litigation where possible in favor of conciliation.74 The Court
recognized in Crawford that an interpretation of the term "oppose" that
promotes an employee's ability to bring discrimination to the attention
of an employer without fear of reprisal would best serve that goal. 75 If
an employer asks an employee about discrimination as part of an
investigation into alleged discrimination, that employee should be
encouraged to speak up without fear of retribution. Allowing the
employee to do so would assist the employer's investigation, help to
eliminate possible discrimination in the workplace, and possibly avoid
litigation. Restricting actionable opposition only to those situations
where the employee initiates the conversation about the discrimination
with the employer would undermine these goals. The Court's holding,
therefore, comports with the statute's primary objective.
of hostile work environment committed by a supervisory employee that do not result in a tangible
employment action, if the employer exercises reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any
discriminatory conduct, and the plaintiff fails to take advantage of the preventive or corrective
opportunities or to avoid harm otherwise. See id. Accordingly, the Court reasoned that wherever
the bar is set with regard to retaliation claims, employers have a strong incentive (in the form of the
affirmative defense) to ferret out and put a stop to discriminatory activity in their operations. Id.
Further, the Court explained that the Sixth Circuit's rule would create an untenable catch 22 for
employees. See id at 852-53. If the employee speaks up in response to an employer's inquiry
during an internal investigation, the employer would be free to sanction the employee without
penalty. Id. If, however, that employee keeps quiet and later files a Title VII claim, the employer
may escape liability under Burlington Industries and Ellerth by arguing that while it took reasonable
care to prevent and correct discrimination, the employee failed to take advantage of the
opportunities the employer provided during the investigation. Id.
72. See Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 145 (2004) (discussing Congress' purpose of
promoting conciliation rather than litigation in Title VII controversies); see, e.g., McKennon v.
Nashville Banner Pub'g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 358 (1995).
73. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806 ("It would therefore implement clear statutory policy and
complement the Government's Title VII enforcement efforts to recognize the employer's
affirmative obligation to prevent violations . . . .").
74. See Suders, 542 U.S. at 145 (2004). ("The Court reasoned that tying the liability standard
to an employer's effort to install effective grievance procedures would advance Congress' purpose
'to promote conciliation rather than litigation' of Title VII controversies." (citing Burlington
Industries, Inc., 524 U.S. at 764)).
75. See Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 852.
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As explained below, however, Justice Alito opined that the court
went too far by noting that the term oppose could mean opposition by
opinion. That definition, he warned, could "open the door" to silent
opposition.n That concern prompted Justice Alito to set the threshold
for actionable opposition at active, purposive conduct.
2. The Concurrence: A Step too Far in His "Opinion"
Justice Alito joined by Justice Thomas concurred in the Court's
judgment.79  He took the majority to task, however, for its "dicta" that
the term "oppose" may mean "to be hostile or adverse to, as in
opinion."so According to Justice Alito, this definition potentially
"embraces silent opposition." 8' Justice Alito proposed limiting
opposition to active, purposive conduct. To that end, he agreed with the
definition of "oppose" that the plaintiff in Crawford suggested, which
included "taking action (including making a statement) to end, prevent,
redress, or correct unlawful discrimination." 82 This standard necessarily
includes specifically intending to bring a grievance to an employer's
attention so that it may take one of the enumerated actions.83
Justice Alito admitted that "to be hostile or adverse to, as in
opinion" was an accepted usage of the term "oppose," but he questioned
whether such opposition was covered by Title VII.84  He warned that
"[i]t would open the door to retaliation claims by employees who never
expressed a word of opposition to their employers."85 He acknowledged
many such claims would fail because the employee would be unable to
76. See id. at 854 (Alito, J., concurring) ("While [defining 'oppose' as 'hostile or adverse to,
as in opinion'] is certainly an accepted usage of the term 'oppose,' the term is not always used in
this sense, and it is questionable whether silent opposition is covered by the opposition clause of 42
U.S.C. 2000e-39a.").
77. Id.
78. See id.
79. Id. at 853.
80. See id. at 854. Justice Alito agreed with the Court's holding that Crawford's testimony
given during an internal investigation satisfied the definition of opposition conduct. Id. at 853. He
further agreed with the EEOC's position that an employee communicating a belief about
discrimination is virtually always opposition. See id.
81. Id. at 854.
82. Id.
83. Id. Justice Alito opined that a lesser standard that protects conduct that "is not active and
purposive" would "have important practical implications." Id.
84. See id
85. Id.
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show the employer knew of the opposition, and thus would be unable to
prove a causal connection between the opposition and the retaliatory act
that allegedly resulted from that opposition. 8 6  He noted exceptions,
however, where the employee could raise an issue of fact on the question
of causation. This might occur, for instance, where the employee
alleges he complained of discrimination to a coworker "at the proverbial
water cooler" or "in a workplace telephone conversation that was
overheard by a co-worker," or "at a restaurant or tavern frequented by
co-workers" or while attending "a neighborhood picnic attended by a
friend or relative of a supervisor"-the inference being that the
employee's opposition conduct somehow made it back to the plaintiffs
employer.
Justice Alito's "active, purposive" requirement is cramped. For
instance, in Crawford the court used as an example of opposition
conduct of a supervisor who refuses to discharge a subordinate although
the supervisor is directed to do so for discriminatory reasons. 89 Such
conduct has been called passive in contrast to active opposition.90
Crawford would appear to protect the supervisor in these
circumstances.9 '
Assuming Justice Alito's definition would embrace passive
opposition, his purposive requirement seems out of step with Crawford
and the plain language of Title VII. The majority in Crawford pointed
out that people opposed slavery without doing any more than disclosing
that opposition.92 Such persons may have expressed their opposition
without doing so to end, prevent, or correct it but simply as a means to
communicate their feeling about it or indeed for no particular reason at
all. Further, the statute imposes no intent requirement on the
86. See id. at 854.
87. See id.
88. Id.
89. See id. at 851 (majority opinion) ("[W]e would call it 'opposition' if an employee took a
stand against an employer's discriminatory practices not by 'instigating' action, but by standing pat,
say, by refusing to follow a supervisor's order to fire a junior worker for discriminatory reasons.").
90. See McDonnell v. Cisneros, 84 F.3d 256, 262 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that opposition
may encompass such "passive" conduct as refusing to carry out an employer's wish to prevent
subordinates from filing discrimination complaints); see also discussion infra Part III.A.
91. See McDonnell, 84 F.3d at 262; cf EEOC v. Navy Fed. Credit Union, 424 F.3d 397, 407
(4th Cir. 2005) (supervisor opposed employer's scheme to fire her subordinate who had complained
about discrimination by refusing to go along with the employer's plan to give the subordinate
favorable but inaccurate evaluations to combat the subordinate's charges of retaliation).
92. Cravford, 129 S. Ct. at 851.
93. Seeid.at851.
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employee.94 It says nothing about the employee having to bring the
opposition directly to the employer's attention.95 The intent requirement
falls on the employer, which may not intentionally discriminate against
the employee because of the employee's opposition.96
Yet, Justice Alito's concern about silent or unexpressed opposition
is not totally unfounded. Because Title VII liability requires a showing
that the employer discriminated against the employee because of the
employee's opposition, the employee must prove the employer was
aware of it.97  Courts, however, have been parsimonious with the
knowledge requirement. Unless a plaintiff can show by direct or
circumstantial evidence that the employer knew of the protected activity,
the employee's claim will most likely fail.98 Speculation about
94. See Title VH of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006).
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. Courts have not hesitated to rule against plaintiffs where they present facts similar to
those presented by Justice Alito in his concurrence where there is no evidence the employer or the
decision maker actually learned of the protected activity. See discussion supra p. 117; see, e.g.,
Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 567 F.3d 804, 809 (6th Cir. 2008) (while plaintiff alleged that
coworkers were aware of his fiancde's assistance with his EEOC charge, plaintiff failed to allege his
employers knew), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 3542 (2010); Ramirez v. Gonzalez, 225 F. App'x 203,
209-10 (5th Cir. 2007) (judgment in favor of employer properly granted where plaintiff conceded
she did not know whether person who made the decision to terminate her had learned of her
complaints regarding alleged discrimination); Webb v. Level 3 Commc'ns, LLC, 167 F. App'x 725,
735 (10th Cir. 2006) (temporal proximity may be sufficient to establish a causal connection between
the protected activity and the adverse action, but proof is still required that decision maker knew of
protected activity); McShane v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 144 F. App'x 779, 790-91 (11th Cir. 2005) (while
close temporal proximity between the protected activity and adverse action may show the two are
related, neither a court nor a jury may impute knowledge of protected activity where the employer
has sworn that he had no actual knowledge of it); Edwards v. Hyundai Motor Mfg. Ala., LLC, No.
2:07CV908 (MHT), 2009 WL 1257164, at *2 (M.D. Ala. May 5, 2009) (rejecting retaliation claim
where employee complained about sexual harassment but presented no evidence that such
complaint reached her supervisor or anyone else who may have retaliated against her); see also
Demers v. Adams Homes of Nw. Fla., Inc., 321 F. App'x 847 (11th Cir. 2009) ("Even after
Crawford, to engage in protected activity, the employee must still, 'at the very least, communicate
her belief that discrimination is occurring to the employer . . . .') (quoting Webb v. R&B Holding
Co., Inc., 992 F. Supp. 1382, 1390 (S.D. Fla. 1998)); Mickey v. Zeidler Tool & Die Co., 516 F.3d
516, 525 (6th Cir. 2008) (explaining that in some situations "where an employer fires an employee
immediately after learning ofa protected activity, we can infer a causal connection between the two
actions" even if there is no other evidence of retaliation (emphasis added)); Tomanovich v. City of
Indianapolis, 457 F.3d 656, 669 (7th Cir. 2006) (employee's retaliation claim failed as he failed to
show employer knew of his protected activity); Seay v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 340 F. Supp. 832, 841
(E.D. Tenn. 2004) (Title VII liability depends on decision maker having actual knowledge of
employee's protected activity.); EEOC v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., 723 F. Supp. 734, 748
(S.D. Fla. 1989) ("Actual knowledge is required to raise the inquiry that the adverse employment
2010] 123
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knowledge of protected activity generally does not suffice. Thus, Justice
Alito's concerns about the dangers of silent opposition becoming viable
may be overstated.
Still, might Crawford crack open the door to silent opposition?
Some have opined on the possibility." The following section addresses
this question. It explains why silent opposition is inconsistent with the
statute's language, scheme, and purposes.'00
III. SILENT OPPOSITION: A TITLE VII NONSTARTER
Whether the term "has opposed" takes on the meaning of "opinion"
depends on canons of statutory interpretation. When a statutory term is
undefined, the Court has directed that the term is to take on its everyday
common dictionary meaning.' 0 An undefined statutory term may have
multiple meanings (as does the term "oppose"), but whether it takes on
any and all of those meanings is another matter.'0 2 For instance, "[a]
word in a statute may or may not extend to the outer limits of its
definitional possibilities."'0 ' Thus, the term "has opposed" whatever its
everyday meaning, for purposes of Title VII might encompass opinion
or require opposition in its more expressive forms.104
In Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.,t0 the Court set forth the paradigm to
examine whether statutory language is so plain that it can only mean one
action and the employee's [protected] activities were causally linked."). But see Sharp v. City of
Houston, 164 F.3d 923, 930-31 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that in addition to possessing actual
knowledge, an employer may also be liable if it had constructive notice of harassment if the
harassment was so "open and pervasive that the employer should have known of it, had it but
opened its corporate eyes").
99. See, e.g., Lough, supra note 7, at 10 (explaining that Crawford defined opposition to be
adverse to as in opinion and may set the stage for silent opposition); see also Thompson, 567 F.3d at
818 (Martin, J., dissenting) (relying on Crawford to demonstrate that the term "oppose" includes
"silent opposition of everything from gay marriage to the death penalty, without requiring anyone to
shout it from the rooftops"); AVERY, ONTIVEROS, CORRADA, SELMI & HART, supra note 7, at 173
(noting that Crawford "seems to suggest that silent opposition to unlawful discrimination can
sometimes be protected").
100. By silent opposition, this article refers to unexpressed opinion. This definition of silent
opposition is reasonable in light of Crawford's explanation that opposition may mean "to be hostile
or adverse to, as in opinion." See Crawford v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., Tenn.,
129 S. Ct. 846, 849 (2009).
101. See id. at 850.
102. Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 486 (2006).
103. Id.
104. See id.
105. 519 U.S. 337 (1997).
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thing or ambiguous such that other meanings are possible.106  This
paradigm requires examining (1) the specific statutory language itself,
(2) the context in which the language is used, and (3) the broader context
of the statute as a whole to determine whether the language at issue has a
plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in
the case. 10 7  In determining the meaning of a statutory term it is also
proper to consider relevant judicial and other authority on the issue.'0o
Once the statutory term is considered ambiguous, however, Robinson
instructs that the meaning attributed to the term should be the one most
consistent with the statute's purposes.1 09  The following discussion
106. See id. at 340; see also EEOC v. Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 240 F.3d 899, 901 (11th Cir.
2001) (Barkett, J., dissenting) (a statutory term is ambiguous when it is susceptible of multiple
interpretations).
107. See Robinson, 519 U.S. at 340-41. In Robinson, the Court determined whether Title VIi's
anti-retaliation provision protected former as well as current employees. See id. at 339. The
statute's language expressly proscribes retaliation against "employees or applicants for
employment." See id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1964)). The Court explained that whether the
statute was ambiguous as to whether it excluded "former employees" had to be determined by not
only the term "employee" but how that term is used and the broader context of the statute as a
whole. See id. at 341. The Court further adopted the meaning that comported with the purposes of
the statute. See id.; see also Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 240 F.3d at 899-902 (Barkett, J., dissenting)
(applying the analysis in Robinson to determine whether the participation clause applies in
connection with an employer's internal investigation).
108. See Dolan, 546 U.S. at 486 (interpreting a word or phrase in a statue depends on reading
the entire statutory text, considering the purposes and context of the statute and "any precedents or
authorities that inform the analysis"). The Court's analysis in Dolan is similar to the analysis in
Robinson, and indeed the Dolan discussion may be more on point. There, the Court determined
whether the statutory term "negligent transmission of letters or postal matter" contained in the
Federal Torts Claim Act meant mail that is negligently left on a porch resulting in a slip and fall.
See id at 485. The Court acknowledged that the term negligent transmission "could embrace a
wide range of negligent acts ... including creation of slip-and-fall hazards from leaving packets and
parcels on the porch of a residence." Id. at 486. The Court noted that the dictionary definition of
"transmission" implies completed delivery of it. See id. (stating that "in ordinary meaning and
usage, transmission of the mail is not complete until it arrives at the destination"). This was inferred
from Webster's Third New International Dictionary defining transmission as "an act, process, or
instance of transmitting" and defining transmit as "to cause to go or be conveyed to another person
or place"). Id. (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2429 (1971)). The
Court, however, determined that the meaning of negligent transmission of the mail could not be
determined in isolation, and after considering other factors, such as the entire statutory text,
purposes of the statute and relevant precedent, it thought a narrower reading of the term was
appropriate. See id. (holding that negligent transmission for purposes of the statute "does not go
beyond negligence causing mail to be lost or to arrive late, in damaged condition, or at the wrong
address").
109. See Robinson, 519 U.S. at 340-41; Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 240 F.3d at 900 (applying
Robinson, where courts are required to "resolve the case in favor of the reading that best helps to
realize the goals of the statute" when looking to the broader context of the statute to resolve an
ambiguity).
1252010]
HeinOnline  -- 28 Hofstra Lab. & Emp. L. J. 125 2010
HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 28:107
examines these areas and determines that collectively they show the term
"opposed" plainly does not contemplate silent opposition.
A. Unpacking "Has Opposed"
Crawford shows the term "oppose" in Title VII may be ambiguous,
i.e., the word might potentially have more than one meaning in the
context of the statute." 0 Crawford not only rejected the Sixth Circuit's
cramped definition of the undefined term "oppose" contained in Title
VII, but also explained that the word could mean any number of things,
including being "hostile or adverse to, as in opinion."' 11 Justice Alito
acknowledged in his concurring opinion that this was an accepted
meaning of the term.112  Justice Alito's concurrence makes clear, the
term "oppose" is not only undefined but ambiguous. 13
Still, the Court's discussion of retaliation generally, as well as the
interpretation of the term "has opposed" under Title VII by the lower
courts, suggests it contemplates more than opinion.114  Reading the
provision as requiring some form of expression versus merely holding an
opinion is consistent with the Supreme Court's characterization of a
retaliation claim under Title VII as a conduct-based claim. In Burlington
Northern & Santa Fe Railroad Co. v. White,"' the Court explained that
110. See Crawford v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., Tenn., 129 S. Ct. 846, 850
(2009).
111. See id. at 850-51.
112. See id. at 854 (Alito, J., concurring).
113. Id. See Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 567 F.3d 804, 819 (6th Cir. 2009) (en banc)
(Martin, J., dissenting) (stating that Justice Alito's concurrence demonstrates "the meaning of
'oppose' is not plain"), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 3542 (2010). Title VII uses the term "has
opposed." Id. The term is therefore used in its present perfect tense. See GERALDINE WOODS,
ENGLISH GRAMMAR FOR DUMMiEs 34-35 (2d ed. 2010). That tense suggests that some action or
condition began in the past and continues into the present. See id The present perfect tense
indicates that Congress intended that the employee or applicant began opposing the challenged
unlawful employment practice at some point in the past-presumably after the unlawful
employment practice occurred-and that the opposition may continue into the present. See id The
tense is consistent with both conduct, such as "the boy has eaten the grapes," as well as a condition
or state of being, such as "she has loved him a long time." See id. The tense does not necessarily
preclude opposition by opinion and hence silence. Certainly, one could have began opposing an
unlawful employment practice as in opinion at some point in the past, presumably after the unlawful
employment practice began, and that adverse opinion could continue into the present and future.
The fact that the term is used in its present perfect tense does not affect the analysis.
114. See Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 854 (discussing the practical implications in interpreting the
opposition clause to protect conduct that is not active and purposive).
115. 548 U.S. 53 (2006).
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unlike the substantive provisions of the statute, which protect individuals
because of who they are, i.e., their status, the anti-retaliation provision
"seeks to prevent harm to individuals based on what they do, i.e., their
conduct."ll 6 Subsequent decisions have reaffirmed that a potential claim
of retaliation under the opposition clause is triggered when an employee
communicates opposition to an employer's alleged unlawful
employment practice and is sanctioned as a result of that
communication.1 7  Accordingly, while the Court in Crawford
116. Id. at 63; DeCaire v. Mukasey, 530 F.3d 1, 19 (1st Cir. 2008) (holding that the district
court erred when it decided against plaintiff on her retaliation claim on the basis that had she been a
male, the employer would have retaliated in the same manner; a retaliation claim does not hinge on
whether plaintiff is a particular gender, but on whether she engaged in protected activity and was
discriminated against as a result). The provision traditionally has been interpreted by the courts to
protect conduct. See, e.g., Payne v. McLemore's Wholesale & Retail Stores, 654 F.2d 1130, 1136
(5th Cir. 1981) (noting that Title VIi's anti-retaliation provision "requires conduct by the plaintiff
that is in opposition to an unlawful employment practice of the defendant").
117. In Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 128 S. Ct. 1931, 1943 (2008), and CBOCS West, Inc. v.
Humphries, 128 S. Ct. 1951 (2008), the Court appeared to retreat from its characterization of
retaliation as a conduct-based claim and that such a claim is conceptually distinct from a status-
based claim. See, e.g., Gomez-Perez, 128 S. Ct. at 1937 n.1; CBOCS West, 128 S. Ct. at 1960-61.
A careful reading of these cases demonstrates that this is not true. These decisions do not alter the
conduct-based nature of the retaliation claim because it is the complainant's conduct that triggers
the cause of action. In Gomez-Perez and CBOCS West, the Court held that a broad proscription of
discrimination on the basis of a protected characteristic (e.g., age or race) encompasses a
proscription on retaliation as well. For instance, in Gomez-Perez, the Court held that the federal
sector provisions of the ADEA, which bars discrimination "based on age" encompasses a claim for
retaliation as well. See 128 S. Ct. at 1943. The Court relied heavily on principles of stare decisis in
doing so and particularly in Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. ofEduc., 544 U.S. 167 (2005). There, the
Court held that Title IX, which bars recipients of federal funds from discriminating on the basis of
sex, encompassed an implied right of retaliation. According to the Court, discrimination because
the person has complained about sex discrimination is merely another form of discrimination on the
basis of sex. See id. at 173-74. Accordingly, a statute that bars discrimination on the basis of sex
also bars discrimination because of a complaint about sex discrimination. See id. The Court
applied a similar rationale in CBOCS West and Gomez-Perez. What is clear, however, is that in
each case the conduct of the complainant triggered the retaliation claim. It is only when the
employee complains about the discrimination, i.e., engages in some expressive act pertaining to the
discrimination, and the employer discriminates on that basis (i.e., on the basis of the complaint), is
retaliation relevant. This understanding of how these claims work is evident from the Court's
discussion in these cases. See CBOCS West, 128 S. Ct. at 1954 (holding that retaliation claim arises
under section 1981 when a person complains about a violation of another person's contract-related
right); Gomez-Perez, 128 S. Ct. at 1935 (holding that retaliation claim arises under federal-sector
provision of the ADEA when a person is discriminated against for filing a complaint of age
discrimination); Jackson, 544 U.S. at 174 (holding that retaliation claim arose because the plaintiff
complained about sex discrimination against his students). Thus, even after Gomez-Perez and
CBOCS West, a claim of retaliation retains its conduct-based nature. As these cases make clear, the
cause of action arises when an individual is retaliated against for complaining about (or engaging in
some form of expression concerning) the underlying discrimination.
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acknowledged that "to be hostile or adverse to, as in opinion" was a
meaning of opposition, it did not suggest that merely holding an opinion
without more would satisfy the statutory requirement of opposition
activity." 8  Rather, it adopted the EEOC's interpretation of the term,
suggesting that the opposition to an unlawful practice exists from its
disclosure." 9  This disclosure suggests some expression or
communication of opposition beyond mere opinion.
The Court suggested in Crawford that opposition may be inferred
from the circumstances.12 0 The discussion also shows more than opinion
is necessary. 121 For instance, in McDonnell v. Cisneros,122 a case cited
approvingly in Crawford,123 the Seventh Circuit held that a male
employee had stated a claim of retaliation when he was fired for refusing
to control his subordinate by urging her to drop her complaints of sexual
harassment.124  The Seventh Circuit acknowledged that this form of
opposition was passive as it consisted of failing to obey an order to
prevent a subordinate from complaining of discrimination.12 5 According
to the court, however, passive resistance is a time-honored form of
opposition.126 Although the conduct in McDonnell was described as
passive, it cannot properly be characterized as merely opinion or silent
opposition. 127 Rather, it expressed opposition, manifested by a refusal
to participate in an employer's discriminatory activity.
The Ninth Circuit more directly addressed passive resistance as a
form of expressive opposition in Thomas v. City ofBeaverton.'28 In that
case, the plaintiff, Annette Thomas, prevailed in a retaliation action
under the First Amendment and Title VII after refusing to pass over one
of her subordinates, Susie Perry, for a promotion because of Perry's
prior discrimination lawsuit against their employer.129 In response to
concerns from Thomas's supervisor about hiring Perry because of
118. See Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 850-51.
119. See id. at 851.
120. See id. at 850.
121. See id.
122. 84 F.3d 256 (7th Cir. 1996).
123. See Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 851 (noting that opposition may occur by disobeying
management orders to prevent a subordinate from filing an EEOC charge).
124. See McDonnell, 84 F.3d at 261-62.
125. See id. at 262.
126. See id.
127. See id.
128. 379 F.3d 802 (9th Cir. 2004).
129. See id. at 805.
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Perry's prior lawsuit, Thomas responded that she could not justify
refusing to hire Perry because she was the most qualified candidate.13 0
After Perry received the promotion, Thomas's supervisor retaliated
against Thomas in numerous ways.13' Thomas subsequently sued under
the First Amendment and Title VII contending that she was fired
because her superior believed she was opposing discrimination by
promoting Perry despite the employer's disapproval of the promotion
due to Perry's prior complaints of discrimination and retaliation.132
In determining whether Thomas's conduct was expressive conduct
under the First Amendment, the court asked whether Thomas intended
"to convey a particularized message . . . [and whether] in the
surrounding circumstances the likelihood was great that the message
would be understood by those who viewed it." 3 3 The court held that by,
among other things, telling her superiors that she "could not justify" not
giving Perry the promotion, a fact finder could reasonably infer that
Thomas's refusal to acquiesce to her superior's treatment of Perry was
intended to convey her disapproval of the unlawful retaliation against
Perry.134 Further, the court found that the likelihood was great that an
audience would understand Thomas's conduct to convey a message of
disapproval of the retaliation against Perry.'35 The court relied on these
same facts to reverse summary judgment on Thomas's Title VII
retaliation claim.136 According to the court, based on Thomas's actions,
there was sufficient evidence to infer that Thomas had opposed
retaliation against Perry because of Perry's prior Title VII suit.'37
130. See id. at 806.
131. See id. at 807. Thomas was placed on an extended probation and after her supervisor
complained of her job performance-complaints which had not been raised prior to Perry's
promotion-Thomas was fired. See id.
132. See id. at 807-08.
133. Id. at 810 (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405,410-11 (1974)).
134. See id
135. See id.
136. Id. at 812.
137. See id. While First Amendment cases such as in Thomas are helpful to the present
discussion to demonstrate when opposition might be expressive, such cases are not on all fours with
the standard proposed here. This is so because as explained later, an employer may reasonably infer
opposition from a plaintiffs expression although the plaintiff does not intend to express opposition.
See discussion infra Part IV.B. Under the First Amendment, a person must engage in conduct with
the purpose of demonstrating a particularized message and the likelihood must be "great that the
message would be understood by those who viewed it." See Spence, 418 U.S. at 410-11. Under the
standard set forth in this article, where the employee's expression reasonably manifests opposition,
regardless of the employee's intention, and the employer discriminates on the basis of that
manifestation, nothing else is required to impose liability. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1292010]
HeinOnline  -- 28 Hofstra Lab. & Emp. L. J. 129 2010
HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 28:107
Cases such as Cisneros and Thomas demonstrate that action or
inaction often speak as loudly as words. Whether characterized as
passive resistance or a refusal to act, the opposition in such cases goes
beyond merely holding an opinion to doing something or refraining from
doing it in a manner from which a reasonable inference of opposition to
an alleged unlawful employment practice may be inferred. As
explained, Crawford, which discussed opposition in its various forms,
opens the door to opposition by passive resistance.138  The resistance
expresses opposition.
The ambiguity or plainness of the term oppose, however, cannot be
determined in isolation. The analysis turns to the context in which the
language is used by examining the anti-retaliation provision as a whole
and then the structure and purposes of Title VII to ascertain whether the
term is ambiguous as to whether it contemplates silent opposition.
B. Silent Opposition is Inconsistent with Title VII's
Anti-Retaliation Provision
Title VII's anti-retaliation provision involves three concepts
relevant to the present discussion, none of which are consistent with
silent opposition: (1) motivation, (2) knowledge, and (3) instances where
the victim of discrimination involves a third party in his or her
opposition activity.
1. Motivation
The anti-retaliation provision contains an explicit element of
causation. 13 9  The provision bars an employer from discriminating
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006). This interpretation of the statute is consistent with the
statute's language, which bars the employer from retaliating against an employee because of the
employee's opposition. Id The statute says nothing of the employee's intent. Id.
138. See Crawford v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., Tenn., 129 S. Ct. 846, 851
(2009).
139. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). Rarely do employers announce their intention to
discriminate; thus, courts have allowed plaintiffs to show causation either by direct or circumstantial
evidence. See, e.g., Dixon v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 324, 333 (6th Cir. 2007). Most employees
attempt to prove retaliation using the familiar McDonnell Douglas burden shifting scheme. See id
To state a claim under this standard, a plaintiff must show he or she (1) engaged in protected
activity; (2) suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) causation. See id If the plaintiff
successfully makes this showing, the defendant must "articulate [a] legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason" for the alleged adverse action taken against the plaintiff. See id (quoting McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)). Assuming the employer meets this burden, the
130
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because the employee has opposed an unlawful employment practice
under Title VII.14 0  Where the opposition does not serve as the
motivation for or cause of the retaliation, the employer is not liable.' 4 1
2. Knowledge
Because a plaintiff must show that the adverse action resulted from
the employee's engagement in protected activity, the anti-retaliation
provision contains an implicit knowledge component as well.142 These
concepts are intertwined. Unless the plaintiff can show that the
employer knew of the protected activity, it is speculative at best to
suggest the employer acted because of that protected activity. For this
reason, courts typically hold that an employer must have actual
knowledge of the protected activity. 1" If knowledge of opposition is a
necessary component of a retaliation claim, and it is certainly is as it is a
precursor to motivation, then circumstances must exist that would put
the employer on notice of the employee's opposition activity, beyond the
employee holding an opinion. 14 5
3. Opposition for and on Behalf of a Victim of Discrimination
Title VII allows a victim of discrimination to oppose that
discrimination through a representative.146  Thus, a victim of alleged
plaintiff must show that the reason advanced by the defendant was pretext for discrimination. See
Dixon, 481 F.3d at 333. Thus, causation is an element of the plaintiffs prima facie case. See id.
140. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
141. See Greenlee v. Sw. Health Systems, Inc., No. 06-cv-00103-EWN-KLM, 2007 WL
2320544, at *12 (D. Colo. Aug. 10, 2007).
142. See id. at *11 ("Obviously, where the person who takes adverse action against a plaintiff
was unaware of the plaintiffs protected conduct, causation is lacking.").
143. See id. at 12.
144. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
145. While motivation and knowledge are intertwined, I do not suggest that the employer's
knowledge is the sine qua non of its motivation. Liability under Title VII is driven by motivation,
not knowledge. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). Where, however, the plaintiff shows that the employer
was motivated to retaliate because of the protected activity, knowledge is also present. But the
opposite is not always true. A plaintiff can prove knowledge of protected activity on the employer's
part, but fail to show the employer was motivated to discriminate because of the protected activity
despite knowledge of it. See Greenlee, 2007 WL 2320544, at * 12 (explaining that mere knowledge
of the protected activity is insufficient to prove retaliation; plaintiff must present evidence from
which a reasonable inference may arise that the employer's motive to discriminate was based on the
protected activity of which the employer is aware).
146. See EEOC v. V & J Foods, Inc., 507 F.3d 575, 580 (7th Cir. 2007).
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discrimination may affirmatively request another individual, e.g., a
lawyer or other representative, to complain to the employer on the
victim's behalf.14 7  Most but not all courts would protect the victim in
such circumstances.14 8
A victim of alleged discrimination may complain about alleged
discrimination to a third party, but with no expectation that the
complaint will be relayed to the employee's employer.14 9 Whether the
victim is protected if a complaint is passed to the employer without a
specific request from the victim to do so is still unsettled in the lower
courts.5 o The hesitancy to recognize such claims relates to Justice
Alito's concern about silent opposition and is therefore relevant to the
present discussion.
a. Purposive Opposition
Most courts appear to allow employer liability under the anti-
retaliation provision when the individual discriminated against engages
in protected activity by asking a third party to complain on the
individual's behalf.'"' The statute proscribes retaliation against an
147. See id.
148. Seeid.at581.
149. See, e.g., Pitrolo v. Cnty. of Buncombe, N.C., No. 07-2145, 2009 WL 1010634, at *3 (4th
Cir. Mar. 11, 2009) (holding that plaintiff's statements to her father of discrimination at the
workplace was not protected activity because there was no evidence that the plaintiff intended for
her father to pass along her complaints to her employer).
150. See V&JFoods,507F.3dat581.
151. See EEOC v. Ohio Edison Co., 7 F.3d 541, 543, 545-46 (6th Cir. 1993) (holding that
plaintiff stated a claim for retaliation after his offer for reinstatement was revoked after his
representative engaged in protected activity on his behalf); see also Holt v. JTM Indus., Inc., 89
F.3d 1224, 1227 n.2 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Ohio Edison approvingly for the proposition that one
who engages an agent to complain about discrimination on his or her behalf falls within the scope of
the anti-retaliation provision as that person has opposed an unlawful employment practice under the
statute's plain language); cf Ackel v. Nat'l Commc'ns, Inc., 339 F.3d 376, 385 (5th Cir. 2003)
(holding that plaintiff had not engaged in protected activity when she was fired after complaining of
discrimination to a coworker, who in turn informed the company's general manager and president;
plaintiff neither complained on her own nor asked her coworker to act on her behalf). In V & J
Foods, 507 F.3d at 580-81, a pre-Crawford case, the Seventh Circuit opined that it did not need to
hold that every time an alleged victim of discrimination uses a representative to complain on his her
behalf, the victim is protected. Id. However, the Court extended protection to particular types of
agents-lawyers and parents for minor children. Id. at 580. Thus, in V & J Foods, the court held
that a teenage daughter was protected against retaliation where her mother complained on her
daughter's behalf. See id. at 580-81 (minor daughter asserted viable retaliation claim against
employer when the child's mother opposed discrimination on behalf of her teenage daughter; where
a parent, guardian, or lawyer acts on behalf of another, the opposition is imputed to the underlying
132 [Vol. 28:107
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employee because "he" has opposed an unlawful employment
practice.' 5 2 The third party who actually complains to the employer is
deemed to act as the representative or agent of the victim.1 3
Consequently, the "he" in the statute is broad enough to cover the victim
who complains through an agent.154
The courts that have directly addressed the issue have had little
problem recognizing a retaliation claim on behalf of the underlying
victim in this situation.' 15 The victim who asks another to complain on
his or her behalf acts purposively, although indirectly, as he or she seeks
to bring a grievance to the employer's attention presumably to end,
correct, or remediate it or for some other reason. The underlying
victim's opposition conduct should satisfy the stringent active, purposive
standard proposed by Justice Alito.
b. Non-Purposive Opposition
A different situation arises, however, where the underlying victim
complains to a third party who, in turn, passes the information on to the
employer without a specific request by the victim to do so. Lower courts
have been hesitant to extend protection to the victim who failed to ask
purposively. For instance, the Fourth Circuit in Pitrolo v. County of
Buncombe'5 held that an employee's complaint about sex
discrimination made to her father, who reported the complaint to her
employer, was not actionable. 157  The Court held that there was no
evidence that the plaintiff intended for her father to pass along her
complaint although it was undisputed that her employer actually learned
of her complaint.' In so holding, the court pointed to Justice Alito's
concurrence to demonstrate that "Crawford does not extend to cases
where employees do not communicate their views to their employers
through purposive conduct."l 5 9
victim of discrimination). While the court approved representative opposition through a
parent/guardian or lawyer, the court did not reach the issue of whether opposition manifested by
another type of representative is actionable. See id. at 581.
152. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006).
153. See Ohio Edison Co., 7 F.3d at 545-46.
154. See id.
155. See id.
156. No. 07-2145, 2009 WL 1010634 (4th Cir. Mar. 11, 2009).
157. See id. at *3.
158. See id.
159. See id. at *3 n.6.
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Similarly in Ackel v. National Communications,160 a plaintiff told a
non-supervisory employee that a company vice-president made frequent
sexual advances toward her.16 ' The plaintiffs coworker reported the
charge to her employer, and the plaintiff was subsequently discharged. 162
The Fifth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs retaliation claim as she neither
complained directly to management herself about the harassment nor
directed her coworker to complain on her behalf.16 3 Her coworker was
acting solely on her own accord. 16 4
Refusing protection in cases such as Pitrolo and Ackel may be a
precaution to prevent protecting silent opposition. That concern, in part,
animated Justice Alito's Crawford concurrence.165  He contended that
interpreting the opposition clause to protect conduct that is less than
active and purposive "would open the door to retaliation claims by
employees who never expressed a word of opposition to their
employers," i.e., silent opposition.' 66 He warned that in some such cases
the employee may be able to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the
employer indirectly learned of the opposition.167 Such cases, however,
could be addressed on their facts. If the employee fails to allege
sufficient facts to show an employer or decision maker was aware of that
party's opposition, then the employee will not have a claim. Courts have
not hesitated to grant judgment in favor of defendants where plaintiffs
fail to demonstrate the employer was aware of the opposition.168 To
deny coverage outright is contrary to the plain language of the statue,
which, at most, requires only that employees oppose an unlawful
employment practice, which unquestionably occurred in these cases.
And in any event, employers in such instances cannot claim the
opposition is silent as they, in fact, learn of it and cannot be held liable
without proof of that knowledge.1 6 9
160. 339 F.3d 376 (5th Cir. 2003).
161. See id at 381.
162. See id.
163. See id. at 385.
164. See id.
165. See Crawford v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., Tenn., 129 S. Ct. 846, 854
(2009) (Alito, J., concurring).
166. Id.
167. See id.
168. See supra note 98.
169. See Pitrolo v. Cnty. of Buncombe, N.C., No. 07-2145, 2009 WL 1010634, at *3 (4th Cir.
Mar. 11, 2009) (holding that despite the employer learning of the plaintiffs opposition from a third
party, plaintiffs claim was rejected).
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The next section considers the opposition clause in the context of
the broader statutory scheme and purposes of Title VII. As explained
below, the analysis further demonstrates that opposition contemplated by
the statute is inconsistent with silent opposition.
C. Expressive Opposition is Consistent with the Statutory Scheme and
Purposes That Underlie It
Title VII's anti-retaliation provision works in conjunction with its
substantive provisions, which bar discrimination on the basis of certain
protected categories. The statutory scheme and purposes that underlie it
are more consistent with an expressive form of opposition that puts the
employer on notice of employee opposition to potential workplace
discrimination and simultaneously protects employees who provide such
notice.
This section makes the case for interpreting the anti-retaliation
provision in this manner, in part, by examining the Court's decisions in
the area of sexual harassment. The Court has created an affirmative
defense for employers in cases involving harassment by supervising
employees.17 0 The Court has explained that the structure and purposes
of Title VII animate that defense.17 ' In Crawford, the Court discussed
the connection between its harassment defense and the opposition
clause. 172 It explained that the defense is meant to encourage employees
to make employers aware of workplace discrimination.17 3 Further, once
employers are made aware of such discrimination, the statute is designed
to encourage employers to comply voluntarily with the statute's primary
goal of eliminating workplace discrimination by promptly correcting
it.17 4  Effectuating these goals requires an effective anti-retaliation
provision that operates prior to an employee filing an EEOC charge. The
opposition clause serves that purpose.175  That clause, therefore, is
designed to protect employees who through words or conduct, action or
inaction make employers aware of discrimination so that the latter
fulfills its duty to correct it.176 As explained below, this scheme is
170. See Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 852.
171. See id. at 852-53.
172. See id. at 852.
173. See id.
174. Id.
175. See Sias v. City Demonstration Agency, 588 F.2d 692, 695 (9th Cir. 1978).
176. Id.
2010] 135
HeinOnline  -- 28 Hofstra Lab. & Emp. L. J. 135 2010
HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENTLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 28:107
inconsistent with silent opposition.
1. External Investigations
Title VII's substantive provision makes it an unlawful employment
practice to discriminate on the basis of race, color, sex, national origin,
or religion.17 7  The statute provides that an individual encountering
discrimination based on a protected status may file or have filed on his
or her behalf a charge of discrimination with the EEOC or an analogous
state agency.'7 8 The filing of the charge triggers certain statutory duties
on the part of the EEOC.'79 The agency must notify the employer of the
charge and investigate the claim made to determine whether there is
reasonable cause to believe the charge is true.180  If the investigation
leads the EEOC to determine the charge is true, the next step
contemplated under the statutory scheme is not litigation, but more
informal means of resolving discrimination.' 8 ' The statute requires the
EEOC to attempt to work with the employer to eliminate the
discrimination through conference, conciliation, and persuasion.18 2
The purposes or goals of Title VII reinforce what the statutory
language already suggests. The primary purpose of Title VII is to root
out unlawful workplace discrimination.8 8 Allowing employees to bring
claims of discrimination to the EEOC's attention for purposes of
investigation, conciliation, and if necessary, litigation accomplishes that
goal. The statute's structure shows that Congress never intended
litigation to be the first line of defense to combat workplace
discrimination.184 The statutory scheme and the primary purpose that
underlies it of rooting out discrimination are effectuated through prompt
investigation of complaints and informal correction via conciliation
versus immediate resort to litigation. 8 1
177. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)-(2) (2006).
178. See id. § 2000e-5(a).
179. See id. § 2000e-5(b).
180. See id.
181. See id.
182. See id
183. See EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 77 (1984) ("The dominant purpose of [Title VII]
... is to root out discrimination in employment.").
184. See id. at 77.
185. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-5(b); Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. at 77.
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2. Internal Investigations: Employer and Employee Obligations
Courts typically hold that the opposition clause protects employees
at points before a formal charge is filed.186 Such protection makes sense
only if, as is the case, Congress intended to create an environment where
employees would feel free to speak up about workplace discrimination
in an effort to eliminate it.18 7 Accordingly, even before employees file
an EEOC charge, Congress intended that employees could take their
grievances to their employers without fear of reprisal. 8  By
encouraging employees to do so, Congress sought to provide employers
an opportunity to investigate claims of discrimination and to root it out
voluntarily without in the first instance having to defend itself before the
EEOC or in a court action.189 That Congress intended to achieve Title
VII's primary goal of eliminating workplace discrimination via
employers and employees working together is evidenced by Title VII's
history.
When Title VII was originally enacted, the EEOC's investigatory
and enforcement authority was much more circumscribed than it is now
because of Congress' desire that the statute would "encourage employers
to comply voluntarily with the Act." 90 It was only when Congress
realized its desire was too optimistic that it enlarged the EEOC's
authority.' 9 ' Congress, however, never abandoned its original desire to
186. See discussion supra Part II.A.
187. See Sias v. City Demonstration Agency, 588 F.2d 692, 695 (9th Cir. 1978).
188. See id. (interpreting opposition clause to protect employees who bring discrimination
complaints to their employer's attention and noting that "[i]t should not be necessary for an
employee to resort immediately to the EEOC or similar state agencies in order to bring complaints
of discrimination to the attention of the employer with some measure of protection [and t]he
resolution of such charges without governmental prodding should be encouraged"); see generally
H.R. Rep. No. 914 (1990), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2401 ("The purpose of [Title VlI] is to
eliminate, through the utilization of formal and informal remedial procedures, discrimination in
employment based on of race, color, religion, or national origin.") (emphasis added).
189. See Sias, 588 F.2d at 695.
190. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. at 77. When Title Vll was enacted, Congress granted the EEOC
the authority to investigate charges of discrimination. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
Pub. L. 88-352, § 706(a), 78 Stat. 259 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b)). If
the EEOC determined that reasonable cause existed and that the employer discriminated against the
employee, the agency's authority was limited to resolution by informal methods of conciliation,
conference and persuasion. See id.
191. See Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. at 77. The EEOC's enforcement authority was greatly
expanded in 1972. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. 92-261. § 4, 86 Stat.
103, 124-28 (1972) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5).
2010]1 137
HeinOnline  -- 28 Hofstra Lab. & Emp. L. J. 137 2010
HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 28:107
have statutory violations remedied through informal means,192 including
through voluntary employer compliance once the employer is made
aware of possible discrimination.193
The goal of eliminating discrimination via informal means,
however, would have been severely undermined if after being made
aware of possible discrimination, the employer could have then punished
employees for raising the issue.' 94 Indeed, failing to protect employees
who report discrimination to their employers against retaliation might
have actually spurred instead of reduced the need for government
intervention and litigation as it would have forced employees to run to
the EEOC in the first instance. 95 Employees would have had absolutely
no incentive to bring any claim to an employer's attention for informal
resolution.19 6 As the Ninth Circuit recognized long ago, the opposition
clause is necessary to encourage informal resolution of discrimination
complaints without government meddling.19 7
The Supreme Court has recognized that Title VII's statutory
scheme and the goals that underlie it-attempting to root out
discrimination that comes to the employer's attention by informal
methods-apply in the pre-charge context. This recognition has most
notably arisen in the Court's sexual harassment jurisprudence. In
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth'98 and Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton,'99 the Court addressed when an employee alleging hostile work
environment sexual harassment by a supervisor under Title VII may hold
an employer liable for that harassment.200
192. See Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. at 77-78. According to the Court in Shell Oil Co., Congress'
continued desire to have statutory violations remedied outside of the courts is evidenced by its
requirement that if the EEOC finds reasonable cause that the employer has violated the statute, that
it attempt to resolve the issue through conciliation. See id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) ("If the
[EEOC] determines after [its] investigation that there is reasonable cause to believe that the charge
is true, the [EEOC] shall endeavor to eliminate any such alleged unlawful employment practice by
informal methods of conference, conciliation and persuasion.")
193. See Sias, 588 F.2d at 695.
194. See id.
195. See id
196. See id.
197. See id.
198. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
199. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
200. At the outset, the article recognizes the shortfalls of the Burlington-Faragher affirmative
defense and discusses them in the following section. See discussion infra Part IV.C. In part,
because of the gaps in protection for victims of workplace harassment that result largely from the
way lower courts have interpreted the Burlington-Faragher affirmative defense, this article argues
that the active, purposive standard should be rejected as a threshold standard for actionable
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In Burlington and Faragher, the Court held that in the absence of a
tangible employment action, 20 ' an employer is entitled to an affirmative
defense that would absolve it of liability.2 02  The Court held that a
supervisor's harassing conduct should not be attributed to the employer
when the employer can show: (1) it exercised reasonable care to avoid
harassment and to correct it promptly when it might occur, and (2) the
employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of those preventative or
corrective opportunities or otherwise to avoid harm.203 The Court
explained that the affirmative defense implements Title VII's statutory
scheme and the purposes that underlie it.204
The Court, for instance, explained that while Title VII seeks to
make persons whole for the injuries endured because of unlawful
discrimination, the statute's principal objective is not to provide redress
but to influence employer conduct, i.e., to encourage it not to
discriminate in the first instance and promptly to correct discrimination
when it learns of it. 20 5 The affirmative defense is intended to assist this
goal by encouraging conciliation between the employer and employee
rather than litigation.20 6 It recognizes the employer's affirmative
opposition. See generally id. However, the discussion in this section is intended to demonstrate
that the Court's discussion of the affirmative defense and the reasons for it further show that silent
opposition is not contemplated by Title VII's anti-retaliation provision.
201. The Court defined a tangible employment action as "a significant change in employment
status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different
responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits." Burlington Indus., 524 U.S.
at 761.
202. See id. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 805. Where the employee fails to show the
employer took a tangible employment action, an employee may still establish a right to recover
under a hostile work environment theory. See Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 133 (2004).
The plaintiff must show, among other things, that the harassment was "sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of [their] employment." See id. (quoting Meritor Savings
Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)). In addition, there must be some basis to hold the
employer liable. See id. The employer is not liable if it can prove the elements of the affirmative
defense. See id at 134.
203. See Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 765.
204. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 805 ("This composite defense would, we think, implement the
statute sensibly, for reasons that are not hard to fathom.").
205. See id. at 806. The statute's preference for conciliation is evidenced by Congress'
requirement that the EEOC investigate discrimination claims and seek to remedy them via informal
means such as conciliation if the agency finds reasonable cause that discrimination exists. See Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (2006).
206. See Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 764 ("Were employer liability to depend in part on an
employer's effort to create [anti-harassment] procedures, it would effect Congress' intention to
promote conciliation rather than litigation . . . and the EEOC's policy of encouraging the
development of grievance procedures.").
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obligation to prevent statutory violations and gives credit when
employers take reasonable efforts to discharge that duty by, for example,
creating effective workplace anti-harassment policies.207 Requiring
employees to bring harassment to an employer's attention and thus to
avoid the harm of discrimination is borrowed from the general theory of
damages, which requires a victim to avoid or minimize damages that
result from violations of the statute.208 Harm of course is best avoided
by allowing employees to report discrimination without fear of
reprisal.209
In Crawford, the Court recognized the interplay between the
affirmative defense in the harassment context and Title VII's anti-
retaliation provision. 2 10 The employer in that case argued that employer
liability should attach for retaliation only if an employee affirmatively
reports discrimination to an employer and is then sanctioned for doing
so.
2 11 The defendant contended that employers should escape liability if
they retaliate against an employee who merely reports harassment in
response to an employer's question during an internal investigation of a
212discrimination complaint. According to the defendant, employers
would have no incentive to investigate claims of discrimination if
retaliation claims were easy.213 They would rather avoid the headache of
investigating claims of discrimination because if they learn of
discrimination, the employee who reports it and is later disciplined
might allege retaliation.2 14
The Court found the argument nonsensical considering the "strong
inducement" employers have by way of the Burlington-Farragher
affirmative defense to uncover, prevent, and correct harassment.2 15 If an
employer learns of harassment and fails to correct it promptly, it is
subject to liability.2 16 It should not matter, therefore, how the employer
207. See Crawford v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., Tenn., 129 S. Ct. 846, 852
(2009); see also Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 764.
208. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806 (citing Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 231 n.15
(1982)).
209. See Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 852 (noting that the statutory purpose of avoiding harm to
employees would be severely undermined if employees could be penalized for answering employer
questions about possible workplace discrimination).
210. See id.
211. See id. at 851-52.
212. See id. at 850.
213. See id. at 851-52.
214. See id. at 852.
215. See id.
216. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998).
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is made aware of possible harassment, either affirmatively or in response
to a question.2 17 What matters is what employers do with that
information-use it to correct harassment or to retaliate against the
person reporting it. If the employer uses it for the latter purpose then it
is not advancing one of the goals that animate the affirmative defense,
that of incentivizing employers to ferret out and correct harassment.
The Court in Crawford explained that the employer and Sixth
Circuit's rule would also undermine one of the statute's primary
objectives of avoiding harm to employees.2 18 If employers could fire
employees who report discrimination, then employees would have good
reason to keep mum if asked by an employer about discrimination
considering that they could be fired for reporting such offenses against
themselves or others.219
The structure of the statute and purposes underlying it, therefore,
are at least in theory designed to encourage employees to bring their
grievances forward to an employer's attention. The opposition clause
assists in that goal by allowing the employee to raise the issue of
discrimination with an employer before resorting to an administrative
agency and ultimately litigation in an effort to avoid harm and work with
the employer to stop its discriminatory practices. 22 0 Neither the statutory
scheme nor purposes that underlie it are consistent with silent or opinion
opposition.
In sum, the anti-retaliation provision and the various concepts it
encompasses are inconsistent with silent opposition. The term "has
opposed" considered in isolation may refer to opinion or something
broader. However, the term has typically been interpreted to refer to
words or conduct from which opposition may be inferred, indicating the
term as used in the statute refers to an expressive form of opposition.
This interpretation is sound considering the explicit requirement that the
employer be motivated by the opposition and the implicit requirement
that the employer be aware of it. Finally, neither the structure nor
purposes of Title VII are consistent with the concept of silent opposition.
With silence disposed of, the following section examines where to
draw the line for actionable opposition under Title VII's anti-retaliation
provision. In doing so, it demonstrates that the active, purposive
217. See Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 852.
218. See id.
219. See id.
220. Sias v. City Demonstration Agency, 588 F.2d 692, 695 (9th Cir. 1978).
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standard Justice Alito proposes is as untenable a standard as silence.
IV. STRIKING A BALANCE BETWEEN SILENT AND ACTIVE,
PURPOSIVE OPPOSITION
The active, purposive standard unnecessarily limits protection
under the anti-retaliation provisions. There is a broad swath of activity
that stands between silence and active, purposive conduct. A proper
balance between silent opposition and the active, purposive form of
opposition advocated by Justice Alito is to require some expression of
opposition on the employee's part. Such expression may take many
forms from disclosing it by words as the plaintiff in Crawford did, to
conduct or even inaction, from which an employer may infer opposition,
as is the case in the passive resistance cases. As long as the employee
manifests opposition, the employer should be barred from discriminating
on the basis of that manifestation.
To the extent the active, purposive standard is an effort to stave off
claims where there is little to no proof that the employer learned of the
opposition, the standard misses the mark. As explained, the lower courts
have generally insisted that employees show that employers possessed
actual knowledge of the employee's protected activity to allege an
actionable retaliation claim.2 2 1 Thus, the standard goes too far to protect
employers against retaliation claims arising under the opposition clause
"by employees who never expressed a word of opposition to their
employers." 2 2 2 Moreover, the active, purposive standard is ill-advised
for several other reasons.
A. The Standard is Inconsistent with the Plain Language of the Statute
The plain language of the anti-retaliation provision bars employers
from retaliating against employees for the latter's opposition to
discrimination.2 23 The statutory language is unambiguous.224 The
221. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
222. See Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 854 (Alito, J., concurring).
223. See Title VIl of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(3)(a) (2006).
224. The issue here is not whether a word or phrase in the statute is ambiguous and could be
interpreted as imposing an intent requirement on the employee. Cf Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 546
U.S. 481, 485-86 (2006) (determining whether the statutory term "negligent transmission of mail" is
ambiguous by using methods of statutory interpretation); Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337,
340-41 (1997) (considering whether the word "employee" might encompass former employees).
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statute imposes no intent requirement on the employee but only on the
employer, which may not discriminate against the employee on the basis
of that opposition. Thus, an employee is not required to oppose
discrimination for any particular purpose, such as to end or prevent it as
225the active, purposive standard requires. As long as the employee
manifests an expression of opposition, the statute requires no more of
that employee. If the employer discriminates against the employee
based on that expression, the employee may assert a retaliation claim.
B. The Standard Ignores the Possibility of Unintentional Opposition
Because the focus of opposition is properly placed on whether,
rather than on how the employer learns of it, an employee may also
manifest opposition unintentionally. The EEOC has long interpreted
Title VII as permitting unintentional opposition.2 26 According to the
EEOC, if an employee's conduct is interpreted by an employer as
opposing an unlawful practice and the employer retaliates on the basis of
its own interpretation, the employer has violated Title VII's anti-
227
retaliation provisions. An employee in these circumstances may not
even be aware he or she is sending a message of opposition to a
Rather, the active, purposive standard is an attempt to read language into the statute that is plainly
not there. The Court has rejected such attempts in other contexts. See, e.g., Domino's Pizza, Inc. v.
McDonald, 546 U.S. 470, 479-80 (2006) (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 required person stating
cause of action to have a contractual relationship with defendant and plain text did not support
plaintiffs claim where he had no such contractual relationship with defendant but only acted as an
agent for the corporation that did have such a relationship; the Court rejected plaintiffs policy
arguments that contradicted the plain text of statute); Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 98-
99 (2003) (rejecting argument that a plaintiff is entitled to a mixed-motive jury instruction only
upon presenting "direct evidence" of discrimination; statute "on its face" imposes no such
requirement on the plaintiff to receive a mixed-motive instruction, and if Congress had intended to
impose such a requirement, "it could have made its intent to do so clear by including language to
that effect" in the statute).
225. While requiring the employee to bring the discrimination to the employer's attention for
the specific purpose of ending it might effectuate the statutory goal of avoiding harm, for other
reasons explained in this section, the rule is not only contrary to the language of the statute but
undermines other goals of Title VII. See discussion infra Part IV.D.
226. See EEOC Decision No. 71-345, 2 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1083, 1084 (Oct. 13,
1970) (determining that reasonable cause existed that employer violated Title VII when it fired
employee for referring black applicant to employer; employee's referral unintentionally served as
opposition to employer's unwritten policy of not hiring black females and employee's discharge
resulted from her inadvertent opposition).
227. See id. (The purpose of the retaliation provision would be "defeated if employers could
with impunity retaliate against employees for behavior which unintentionally has the effect of
opposing" an unlawful employment practice).
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potentially unlawful employment practice. However, if the employer
nevertheless infers or interprets such a message and discriminates on that
basis, the anti-retaliation provision is violated.228
Courts also have held that an employer may retaliate against an
employee because it reasonably believed that the employee engaged in
protected activity although the employee had not done so at all. 2 29 The
critical issue is whether the employer infers or interprets opposition from
the employee's expression and discriminates on that basis. This reading
is consistent with the statute's language, which bars employers from
retaliating because of employee opposition. If the employer
discriminates because it wrongly believes the employee was engaging in
opposition, the employer still discriminates on the basis of the
employee's expression of opposition.2 3 1  The employee's intent to
oppose is therefore irrelevant; the relevant inquiry is what the employer
intends.
Further, permitting employers to retaliate against employees based
on what the employer reasonably believes to be opposition to alleged
unlawful discrimination (although the employer was wrong because the
employee did not intend to oppose any practice) would undermine the
statute's goals. When the employer is made aware that discrimination
may exist or is being complained of, it should seek to resolve it. By
doing so, it effectuates the statutory goals of self-correction, conciliation,
and rooting out discrimination that animate Title VII. If instead of using
the information it gleans from an individual to investigate and eliminate
228. See id.
229. See Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 571-72 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that
plaintiff who did not actually engage in protected activity but who was allegedly retaliated against
because he was perceived to have engaged in such activity stated a retaliation claim under the
ADEA. The statute focuses on employer's specific intent to discriminate and the fact that employee
did not actually engage in protected activity but was perceived to have done so and was
discriminated against on that basis states a claim for retaliation); Grosso v. City Univ. of N.Y., No.
03 Civ. 2619NRB, 2005 WL 627644, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2005).
230. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006).
231. See Fogleman, 283 F.3d at 571-72. A short example demonstrates this point. For
instance, an employee may manifest opposition by attending an event for informational purposes
only, but is staged by others to challenge an employer's discriminatory practices of not hiring
women. Although the employee may not intend to send a message of opposition to that practice by
attending the meeting (but is there only to gather information) that person's attendance may
reasonably send such a message. Cf id. (holding that plaintiff who did not actually engage in
protected activity but who was allegedly retaliated against because he was perceived to have
engaged in such activity stated a retaliation claim under the ADEA. The statute focuses on
employer's specific intent to discriminate.); Grosso, 2005 WL 627644, at *3 (employing same
analysis under Title VII).
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the alleged discrimination, it opts to retaliate instead, the employer
undermines these statutory goals and should be held in violation of the
anti-retaliation provisions. As long as the employee manifests an
expression of opposition to the alleged unlawful employment
discrimination, the employer should be prohibited from discriminating
against the employee on that basis.
The employer's duty under Title VII to root out discrimination is a
primary reason the active, purposive standard misses the mark.232 It is
true that requiring an employee to affirmatively report discrimination to
the employer may effectuate the statutory goal of avoiding harm on the
employee's part. It would serve to put the employer on notice of possible
discrimination so that the employer could remediate it-clearly a goal of
Title VII. However, limiting protection unnecessarily to those instances
minimizes the importance of the employer's duty to investigate, self-
correct, and engage in conciliation. To that end, whether the employer
suspects possible discrimination by words or reasonable inference from
conduct or inaction, the employer should have a duty to investigate and
extirpate the discrimination if it exists. If the employer could reasonably
understand that the employee opposes an alleged discriminatory
practice, but uses that knowledge to retaliate against the employee, the
anti-retaliation provision is violated just as certainly as if the employee
had marched into the employer's office and stated opposition against the
employer's discriminatory practices.
C. The Standard Compounds Gaps in Protection Afforded in Workplace
Harassment Law
Scholars have noted that the law governing workplace harassment,
particularly the Burlington-Faragher affirmative defense,23 3 leave
serious gaps in protection for victims of unlawful harassment.234 As
explained below, the active, purposive standard would only exacerbate
232. See Crawford v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., Tenn., 129 S. Ct. 846, 854
(2009) (Alito, J. concurring). Under this standard, an employee is not protected against retaliation
unless the employee specifically intended to bring the opposition before an employer for the
purpose of ending, preventing, redressing, or correcting unlawful discrimination. See id
233. See discussion supra Part 11I.C.2.
234. See Brake & Grossman, supra note 28, at 879 (explaining that lower courts interpreting
the affirmative defense have taken an anti-employee view); Lawton, supra note 28, at 212
(contending that it is questionable whether the affirmative defense was the best method to achieve
Title VII's goal of preventing workplace harassment).
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those gaps.235
Although the Court has interpreted Title VII's anti-retaliation
provision broadly, it acknowledged in Crawford that fear of reprisal was
the primary reason discrimination often goes unreported.23 6 Scholars
also have noted that with sexual harassment in particular,237 employees
are hesitant to report discrimination through formal means because those
that do fear being (and often are) labeled hypersensitive or
troublemakers.2 38 In fact, filing a formal discrimination complaint is the
least likely response for women who are victims of sexual harassment.2 39
The social costs of being stamped with the troublemaker badge and fear
of retaliation are the primary reasons women do not complain about
harassment. Rather than complaining formally, victims are more likely
to deal with harassment in other ways, such as sharing their experiences
with friends and coworkers or seeking an out, for instance, by transfer or
absenteeism.240 The law of sexual harassment does not take these
workplace realities into account.
Because of the fear of reporting harassment, victims either fail to
report it or delay doing so, derailing their sexual harassment claim. That
235. It would only further add to what Professors Deborah Brake and Joanna Grossman have
called the failure of Title VII as a system for claiming discrimination rights. See generally Brake &
Grossman, supra note 28, at 861-66 (explaining how prompt complaint doctrines, including the
Burlington-Faragher affirmative defense and other rules imposed on plaintiffs asserting
employment discrimination, have served as barriers to plaintiffs claiming rights under Title VII).
236. See Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 852 (citing Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation, 90 MINN. L. REV.
18, 20, 37 & n.58 (2005)).
237. See Brake & Grossman, supra note 28, at 896 ("The best data about how employees
actually respond to discrimination come in the sexual harassment context because only there does
the law officially require internal grievances as a prerequisite to vindicating rights.").
238. See id. at 900 (explaining that social psychologists find that women and people of color
who challenge workplace discrimination are perceived to be troublemakers or hypersensitive); see
also Anne Lawton, Between Scylla & Charybdis: The Perils ofReporting Sexual Harassment, 9 U.
PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 603, 605-06, 616 (2007). According to Professor Lawton, women typically
face skepticism when alleging harassment. See id. at 616. The "dominant perception" is that they
are lying, attempting to gain some type of advantage by lodging the complaint or are being
hypersensitive. See id.; see also Long, supra note 2, at 933 ("Individuals who complain about
workplace discrimination are frequently labeled as troublemakers by those in positions of authority
within the organization.").
239. See Brake & Grossman, supra note 28, at 899.
240. See id. at 899; see also Taylor v. Solis, 571 F.3d 1313, 1317 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (explaining
that months before formally complaining about harassment through her employer's formal
procedure, employee confided in a coworker, who was a management employee though not her
supervisor); Baldwin v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Ala., 480 F.3d 1287, 1295 (11th Cir. 2007)
(explaining that before resorting to employer's formal harassment policy, the employee shared
alleged harassment with her secretary and other coworkers because she contended she wanted
nothing in her employee file that might harm her future chances for promotion).
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result is grounded in the way courts have interpreted the Burlington-
Faragher affirmative defense. That standard allows an employer an
affirmative defense to a claim of supervisor hostile work environment
sexual harassment, where it can show (1) it had an effective mechanism
in place, and (2) the employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of
that mechanism or to avoid harm otherwise.24 1 If an employer makes
both showings, courts typically grant judgment in their favor on
liability.2 4 2 Proof that the employer has an "effective" anti-harassment
policy in place generally satisfies the first prong of the affirmative
defense.243
The second prong of the affirmative defense has become a
stumbling block to plaintiffs who have been sexually harassed for
several reasons. First, the lower courts often reject harassment claims
where the employee fails to report the harassment promptly. The
employee's delay demonstrates that the employee unreasonably failed to
take advantage of the employee's reporting procedure or to avoid harm
otherwise.244  The lower courts have interpreted whether a complaint is
prompt rather strictly against plaintiffs.2 45 For instance, a two- to three-
month delay between an initial incident of harassment and the official
complaint is commonly found to be unreasonable,2 46 although shorter
time periods have also been considered unreasonable as a matter of law
as well.247
241. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998); Long, supra note 2, at 952.
242. See Long, supra note 2, at 952.
243. See Lawton, supra note 28, at 214-15. Courts have found that an "effective" harassment
policy contains several features, including (1) the ability for the victim to bypass the harasser in
reporting the harassment; (2) a statement that a complaint will be investigated promptly; (3) a
statement explaining that the victim will not be retaliated against for the complaint; and (4) a
statement that complaints will be kept as confidential as possible under the circumstances. See
Barrett v. Applied Radiant Energy Corp., 240 F.3d 262, 266 (4th Cir. 2001) (listing the
aforementioned factors as indicative of a reasonable policy).
244. See Taylor, 571 F.3d at 1319; Baldwin, 480 F.3d at 1307; Walton v. Johnson & Johnson
Servs., 347 F.3d 1272, 1289-91 (11th Cir. 2003).
245. See Brake & Grossman, supra note 28, at 879 ("Lower courts interpreting the affirmative
defense have taken a particularly anti-plaintiff view of the second prong for determining whether a
delay in filing a complaint was excessive or whether the failure to file a complaint was
reasonable.").
246. See Baldwin, 480 F.3d at 1307 (three-month delay between first incident of harassment
and complaint was unreasonable as a matter of law); Walton, 347 F.3d at 1289-91 (two-and-a-half
month delay too long); cf Taylor, 571 F.3d at 1319 (holding that five-month delay between
harassment that began in fall 2001 and reported the following April was unreasonable as a matter of
law and citing Baldwin approvingly, where three-month delay was held to be unreasonable).
247. See Conatzer v. Med. Prof'l Bldg. Servs., Inc., 255 F. Supp. 2d 1259, 1270 (N.D. Okla.
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Professor Anne Lawton explains that the law treats a delay in
reporting harassment as a proxy for the victim's veracity.248 In general,
the view is that if the harassment were so terrible, the victim would have
reported it right away.249 However, prompt reporting is a poor proxy for
credibility, considering that most employees fail to report harassment in
fear of being labeled a troublemaker or experiencing retaliation and not
because they are lying about the harassment. 250 Victims tend to believe
that if they report the discrimination, their situations might worsen.25'
However, courts typically hold that an employee's generalized fear of
retaliation is insufficient to excuse a failure to promptly report
harassment.252
The second way in which the affirmative defense has derailed
otherwise viable harassment claims is when plaintiffs, who reported the
discrimination to someone other than the designated individuals
contained in the employer's policy, are found to have acted
unreasonably for purposes of the Burlington-Faragher affirmative
defense.253 The law allows employers to satisfy the first prong of the
2003) (holding that a seventeen-day delay between first significant incident of harassment and
complaint was unreasonable). Professor Anne Lawton has argued persuasively that courts have
turned the second inquiry into a per se reasonableness inquiry based on whether the plaintiff
reported or did so immediately after the first incident of harassment. See Lawton, supra note 28, at
215-16. By doing so, courts fail to evaluate the reasonableness of the plaintiff's actions in the
context of the specific case and the empirical evidence showing that victims tend not to initially
respond to harassment by lodging a formal complaint. See id.
248. See Lawton, supra note 238, at 618.
249. See id.; see also Frazier v. Tenn. Dep't of Corrs., No. 3:07-0818, 2008 WL 2781665, at *7
(M.D. Tenn. July 14, 2008) (holding that compliant made three months after first incident of racial
harassment and four days after second incident might give the jury pause in determining whether the
incidents were as serious as plaintiff contends).
250. See Lawton, supra note 238, at 618-19.
251. See id.
252. See Long, supra note 2, at 953. If the fear is grounded on a specific basis, the failure to
report may be excused. See id. Even when the fear is supported by some proof a court may still
find the fear to be unwarranted. See, e.g., Barrett v. Applied Radiant Energy Corp., 240 F.3d 262,
267-68 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that plaintiffs fear of retaliation found unwarranted although she
alleged that two of her employer's managers had sexually harassed other employees in the past and
had not been disciplined).
253. See, e.g., Taylor v. Solis, 571 F.3d 1313, 1319 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (noting that report of
harassment complaint to management employee was unreasonable because policy required
employee report harassment to a company EEO counselor or EEO manager); Ogden v. Keystone
Residence, 226 F. Supp. 2d 588, 601-02 (M.D. Pa. 2002) (explaining that plaintiff acted
unreasonably in mentioning alleged harassment to her supervisors when she failed to ask them to
follow up and failed to follow her employer's complaint procedure to report harassment to human
resources specialist or to bring her complaint to the attention of senior management); Mukaida v.
Hawaii, 159 F. Supp. 2d 1211, 1232 & n. 14, 1233 (D. Haw. 2001) (holding that plaintiff failed to
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affirmative defense despite having a narrow list of persons to which
official complaints may be reported.254 Further, as to the second prong,
unless employees complain only to the persons contained on the list,
they are often found not to have acted reasonably in taking advantage of
the employer's procedures or otherwise avoiding harm.255
If employers and courts were serious about achieving Title VII's
primary goal of eliminating workplace discrimination, employers could
allow those employees who believe they have been victims of
harassment to report their belief to any supervisory or management
employee and put the burden on those employees to report complaints to
the internal department that investigates such complaints.2 56 Courts
should consider whether an employer who fails to issue such a directive
to its management employees has acted reasonably to prevent and
correct harassment. Forcing employees to follow a rigid employer-
imposed guideline regarding reporting harassment places form over
substance when the employee has in fact reported the harassment to a
management or supervisory employee although not one designated in the
employer's official policy.
The active, purposive standard compounds the aforementioned gaps
existing in workplace harassment law. An employee who fails to
complain promptly or to an individual not designated in the employer's
policy would likely lose on her sexual harassment claim. By imposing
an active, purposive standard on retaliation claims, the employee also
would be unable to challenge retaliation that may occur after the
employee complained, even though he or she had no intent to do so to
end, correct, or remediate the harassment. The active-purposive
standard would give employers carte blanche to retaliate against
employees who fail to complain purposively about harassment even
though the reason that victims often fail to actively complain is to avoid
the retaliation that often accompanies such a complaint. An employee
act reasonably in reporting alleged harassment by complaining to her supervisor although he was
not designated in her employer's reporting procedure to receive complaints); Green v. Wills Group,
Inc., 161 F. Supp. 2d 618, 626 (D. Md. 2001) (holding that plaintiffs earlier reports of harassment
to another employee was not notice to employer as the report was not in conformance with
employer's stated policy, which provides for notice to the human resources department).
254. See Lawton, supra note 28, at 214-15.
255. Mukaida, 159 F. Supp. 2d at 1232 & n.14.
256. Some employers adopt such an approach. See Barrett, 240 F.3d at 266 (describing
company policy as allowing an employee who has encountered harassment to "contact any member
of the management team, male or female, with whom [the employee] feels comfortable discussing
the situation") (internal quotation marks omitted).
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who fails to actively or purposively complain may face both harassment
and retaliation, but would be unable to claim any rights under the
statute.257
In Crawford, the Court recognized the interplay between the
Burlington-Faragher affirmative defense and Title VII's anti-retaliation
provision.25 8 In doing so, the Court refused to interpret the opposition
clause in a manner that may have made it less likely that employees
would report harassment to their employers.2 19' The Supreme Court's
interpretation of the anti-discrimination law, including the Burlington-
Faragher affirmative defense, seeks to encourage employees to report
discrimination. However, this interpretation has the effect of punishing
those employees who fail to act in this manner. When an employer is
informed of potential harassment even indirectly and non-purposively,
its duty should be to investigate and eliminate the discrimination, not to
compound the problem by engaging in the very retaliation the employee
feared which led the employee to make an indirect complaint in the first
place. The Burlington-Faragher affirmative defense would eliminate
the possibility of a harassment claim in these circumstances. To that
end, the active-purposive standard further undermines Title VII's goal of
rooting out workplace discrimination because employers would be free
to retaliate against employees for indirect, non-purposive complaints.
Employers would have little incentive not to retaliate in such instances.
Conceivably, as long as the employer can show the plaintiff failed to
report harassment purposively, promptly, or to a particular set of
individuals designated in the employer's harassment policy, then
regardless of the plaintiffs injury, his or her claims for harassment and
retaliation experienced for a complaint received about that harassment
would fail.
D. The Active-Purposive Standard is Premised on Irrelevant
Policy Concerns
A troubling aspect of the push by Justice Alito to require opposition
conduct that is active and purposive is that it appears to be motivated by
257. See generally Wills Group, 161 F. Supp. 2d at 626 (regarding an employee that faced
retaliation after attempting to complain of harassment to another employee).
258. See Crawford v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., Tenn., 129 S. Ct. 846, 852
(2009).
259. See discussion supra Part m.C.
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courts' expanding dockets. 2 60 In his Crawford concurrence, Justice Alito
argued that "[a]n expansive interpretation of protected opposition
conduct would likely cause the [recent spike in retaliation claims] to
accelerate." 2 6 1 The obvious response to that concern, however, is that
Congress, not the courts, should decide how far to extend the anti-
retaliation provision. Congress drafted a statute that grants protection if
an employee opposes a practice made unlawful under Title VII. The
statutory language does not impose an intent requirement on the part of
the employee at all. The only intent requirement falls on the employer,
which may not intentionally retaliate against the employee because of
262the latter's opposition.
Courts have no business relying on irrelevant policy concerns to
promulgate prophylactic rules that narrow a statute's plain language.26 3
That approach is particularly inappropriate with regard to remedial
legislation, which should be interpreted broadly to effectuate the
264purposes of the statute.
The anti-retaliation provision protects an employee from retaliation
because that individual "has opposed" an unlawful employment practice.
When the employee does so whether in response to an employer's
question (as in Crawford) or by some other form of expression, the
employee should be protected by the statute's anti-retaliation provision.
This discussion is not intended to set limits on actionable opposition
conduct under the opposition clause. The discussion shows, however,
that the opposition clause contemplates more than unexpressed opinion
but is consistent with opposition in its more expressive forms.
260. See Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 855 (Alito, J., concurring) (noting that the number of
retaliation claims filed with the EEOC "has proliferated in recent years").
26 1. Id.
262. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(3) (2006).
263. Cf Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 408 (1998) ("Courts may not create their own
limitations on legislation, no matter how alluring the policy arguments for doing so."); City of L.A.
Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 708-09 (1978) (noting that an employer's policy
discriminated against women employees, and thus the Court refused to rely on a policy argument of
"fairness" to allow the employer to discriminate against women based upon generalizations).
264. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471, 504 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(quoting Techerepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967) ("It has long been a 'familiar canon of
statutory construction that remedial legislation should be construed broadly to effectuate its
purposes."')).
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V. PROTECTING MIRIAM
Crawford considered the full breadth of the term oppose and all its
possible meanings. However, considering the statutory language,
context, scheme, and purpose, the term "oppose" as used in the statute
does not envision silent, unexpressed opposition.2 65 That said,
determining how to interpret the term does not mean imposing an
unnecessarily high bar to retaliation claims, particularly considering
their importance in uncovering and eliminating unlawful workplace
discrimination. The active, purposive standard is an unnecessarily high
bar for a successful retaliation claim.
The concerns Justice Alito raises in his concurrence about silent
opposition do not withstand scrutiny. Without proof of actual
knowledge of the employee's protected activity, it is doubtful at best that
an employee's retaliation claim would survive. Moreover, this high bar
shuts off claims where the employer undisputedly learns of the
opposition. The hypothetical set forth in the introduction, which is
loosely based a composite of cases employing the active, purposive
standard, proves the point. In that hypothetical, Miriam is harassed by
her supervisor, but she does not complain directly to her employer.
Instead she voices her complaint to a friend and coworker, who is also a
management employee of the company, who, in turn, passes the
complaint on to human resources, the department that investigates
complaints.
A successful harassment claim on these facts is doubtful
considering Miriam failed to follow her employer's established
procedure.26 6 Her retaliation claim should fare better under the statute.
She expressed opposition, which was communicated to her employer.
Title VII requires no more and thus neither does Crawford.267
According to the Court "[w]hen an employee communicates to her
employer a belief that the employer has engaged in . . . a form of
265. Of course, not all silence is the same. For instance, silence in response to an illegitimate
demand for speech is protected as expressive conduct under the First Amendment. See Wooley v.
Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (reasoning that the right of freedom of thought protected by the
First Amendment against state action includes the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from
speaking at all). Crawford recognized that expressive conduct in its many forms is protected under
the opposition clause by recognizing passive resistance as a viable form of opposition. See
Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 851. Such silence is expressive and communicative. See id.
266. See discussion supra Part IV.C.
267. See Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 851 ("[W]e would naturally use the word [oppose] to speak of
someone who has taken no action at all to advance a position beyond disclosing it.").
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employment discrimination, that communication virtually always
constitutes the employee's opposition to the activity."2 68 The Court did
not hold that this rule applies only when opposition is "directly"
communicated 2 69 to employers or to those instances where the employee
intends to communicate opposition for a delineated purpose.270 That
Miriam's complaint may be considered non-purposive should have no
bearing on the success of her claim.
Pre- and post-Crawford, some courts, however, have rejected this
broad reading of the anti-retaliation provision and endorsed the active,
purposive standard. 27 1 Limiting actionable opposition in this manner
ignores the statute's plain language, undermines the purpose of the
opposition clause to protect employees who complain about
discrimination in informal, workplace settings, and allows employers
fully aware of the opposition to ignore their obligation to investigate the
complaint for veracity and, if true, engage in self correction-a result at
odds with the statute's purposes.
VI. CONCLUSION
Relying on Title VII's broadly worded anti-retaliation provision,
the Court in Crawford rejected active, demanding standards for
opposition conduct to be actionable. As long as the employee expresses
opposition to alleged unlawful employment discrimination that is
communicated to the employer, the latter is prohibited from
discriminating against the employee on the basis of the expression.
268. Id. (quotations omitted).
269. The plaintiff in Crawford communicated her complaint directly to her employer. See
Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 850-51. However, the Court's statement that "[w]hen an employee
communicates to her employer a belief that the employer has engaged in ... a form of employment
discrimination, that communication virtually always constitutes the employee's opposition to the
activity," could be read at least two ways. Id. at 851. It could mean the employee must always
communicate opposition directly to the employer. Or, it could mean that after the employee
communicates opposition, and the employer learns of it, the employee still communicates her
opposition to her employer. See id. The Court's statement, therefore, does not preclude indirect
communication of opposition. See id.
270. See id.
271. See Pitrolo v. Cnty. of Buncombe, N.C., No. 07-2145, 2009 WL 1010634, at *3 & n.6
(4th Cir. Mar. 11, 2009); see also Ackel v. Nat'l Commc'n Inc., 339 F.3d at 376, 385 (5th Cir.
2003) (holding that plaintiff had not engaged in protected activity when she was fired after
complaining of discrimination to a coworker, who in tum informed the company's general manager
and president after plaintiff neither complained on her own nor asked her coworker to act on her
behalf).
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Crawford focused on whether an employer becomes aware of opposition
rather than how it becomes aware of it. Nothing in Crawford suggests
that such communication may not be indirect. Moreover, opposition
may be unintentional. Congress imposed an intent requirement only on
employers, who may not intentionally retaliate against an employee for
opposition. Neither Congress nor (consistent with the statute's plain
language) the Court in Crawford imposed an intent requirement on the
employee. All courts have not yet embraced this expansive reading of
the opposition clause as evidenced by courts adopting the active,
purposive requirement suggested by Justice Alito in his separate
concurring opinion. This failure brings to mind the adage, you can lead
a horse to water, but you can't make him drink. Crawford has opened
these doors, but it is up to the lower courts or perhaps the Supreme Court
in a subsequent decision to walk through them.
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